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TAKING PUBLIC RIGHTS PRIVATE: THE
RHETORIC AND REALITY OF SOCIAL
SECURITY PRIVATIZATION
PATRICIA E. DILLEY *
Abstract: This Article explores the foundations of the Social Security
privatization debate. What is frequently portrayed as a iu
problem to which a "correct" answer can be found is in fact an
ideological and political argument about wealth building versus direct
income support and about the reality and security of public entitlement
as opposed to private property rights. Efforts to use the idea of private
property as the basis of rights in the context of the Social Security
system and other non-retirement .social welfare programs have proven
problematic. This Article suggests that Social Security, far from being a
quaint, retrograde souvenir of the New Deal, was ahead of its time in
creating eC0110111k rights based on effort rather than equity in support
of the public institution of broad-based retirement.
Starvation is the characteristic of some people not having enough
food to eat. It is not the characteristic of there being not enough food
to eat. . . . ISParvation statements translate readily into statements
of ownership of food by persons. . . . Ownership relations are one
kind of entitlement relations. . . . Each link in this chain of entitle-
ment relations "legitimizes" one set of ownership by reference to an-
other; or to some basic entitlement in the form of enjoying the fruits of
one's own labour:
—Amartya
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INTRODUCTION: AESOP REVISITED
The problem of economic survival in old age and retirement is
usually presented as a sort of modern day version of Aesop's fable of
the grasshopper and the ant: the story of the thrifty and forward-
looking alit who stored up grain during the producing season to eat
during the barren time ahead, in contrast to the spendthrift grass-
hopper who merrily consumed all summer without putting aside any-
thing and consequently faced starvation in the winter. 2 An onslaught
of television and print advertising over the last decade seems designed
to persuade younger Americans to follow the ant's example and save
for the winter of unproductive old age. 3
This advertising barrage has been accompanied by an equally
insistent chorus from policy analysts and political leaders of all per-
suasions declaring the urgent need for "entitlement reform" to deal
with the looming demographic disaster Social Security 4 and Medi-
care5
 are said to face when the baby boom generation begins to re-
tire.6
 The debate over Social Security reform covers a wide range of
proposals, from preserving the existing system to replacing it with a
2
 AESOP'S FABLES, WITH A LIFE OF AESOP 121 ( John E. Keller & L. Clark Keating
trans., 1993).
3
 The range and number of advertisements is extreme, consisting primarily of adver-
tisements for various investment houses like the "Thank you Paine Webber" television
campaign: "Thu may be able to live on love. But you definitely can't retire on it." 1999
TIAA-CREIT Advertisement, SMITHSONIAN, NOV. 1999, at 23. ID addition, magazines focusing
on financial services routinely feature retirement savings as the principal reason for in-
vestment and savings. See, e.g., Retire? Think Again. (Chances are you'll be working), U.S. NEws
& WORLD REP., June 2000, at 61-91.
The term Social Security will be used throughout this article to refer only to the cash
benefits provided by the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance ("OASDr) program.
The Old-Age Survivors Insurance ("OASI") program provides benefits for retired workers
and their spouses and children and to survivors of deceased workers. The Disability Insur-
ance ("DI") program provides benefits for disabled workers and their spouses and children
and pays for rehabilitation services for the disabled. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-434 (1994).
While I will discuss the financing of these two trust funds together, there are issues of
financing and eligibility specific to the disability insurance program that are not directly
relevant to the focus of this article, which is the ideological and philosophical roots of
arguments about income support for retirement. The analysis will therefore focus primar-
ily on old-age benefits under Social Security.
5
 Medicare refers generally to the Health Insurance program component of Social Se-
curity, as provided under Title XVIII of the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1994).
This Article will not address the issues surrounding the financing of Medicare, which are
quite different from the financing issues facing the cash benefit programs.
6 See, e.g., PETER G. PETERSON, WILL AMERICA GRow' UP BEFORE IT GROWS OLD? HOW
THE COMING SOCIAL SECURITY CRISIS THREATENS YOU, YOUR FAMILY AND YOUR COUNTRY
21 (1996); SOCIAL SECURITY'S LOOMING SURPLUSES: PROSPECTS & IMPLICATIONS 5-10
(Carolyn L. Weaver ed., 1990).
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system of private accounts with which individual workers would pro-
vide for their retirement and old age. 7 Privatization of Social Security
has recently surfaced as one of the few areas of sharp distinction be-
tween George W. Bush and Al Gore in the 2000 presidential cam-
paign. Governor Bush has proposed a version of privatization as a
centerpiece of his platform,8 while Vice President Gore has attacked
7 At one end of the spectrum are arguments fOr preserving the program as is and ad-
dressing its financial problems by "advance funding" benefits through accumulated payroll
tax surpluses and paying down the overall national debt. Former Commissioner of Social
Security Robert M. Ball has most prominently advocated this course of action, and some
versions of this approach are discussed in HENRY J. AARON ET AL., CAN AMERICA AFFORD
To CROW OLD? PAYING FOR SOCIAL SECURITY 11 (1989). At the oilier end of the spectrum
are proposals to eliminate the program completely in favor of a private account system in
which workers would control the accumulation and investment of their own individual
retirement savings accounts. The nuniber of proposals to privatize Social Security in whole
or in part, most of which are quite similar, is astonishing and too large to list here. Repre-
sentative examples include: MARTIN FELDSTEIN, THE MISSING PIECE IN POLICY ANALYSIS:
SOCIAL SECURITY REvottm 24 (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper 5413,
1996) [hereinafter FELDSTEIN, 14:FORM]; PE'T'ER J. FERRARA, SOCIAL SECURITY: THE INHER-
ENT CON'T'RADICTION 311 (1980); Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Privatizing- Social Security at Home
and Abroad, 86 Am. ECON. REV. 368, 370 (1996); Lewis D. Solomon & Geoffrey A. Barrow,
National Issues: Privatization of Social Security: A Legal and Polity Analysis, 5 KAN. J.L. & Pun.
Pot.'Y 9, 23 (1995); and Sylvester J. Schieber & John B. Moven, Social Security Reform:
Around the Mold in 80 Brays, 86 Am. ECON. REV. 373, 376 (1996). In between these two ex-
tremes are possible intermediate solutions, such as investing payroll tax revenues in the
stock niarket and raishig the retirement age to 70 or above, which represent variations on
either private equity investments for the public program or preservation of the public
program with reduced costs. In FRAMING TIIE SOCIAL SECURITY DEBATE: VALUES, POLITICS,
AND ECONOMICS (R. Douglas Arnold et al. eds., 1998), a variety of authors discuss most of
the middle of the road proposals. Proposals to maintain the current system but substan-
tially modify it are contained in THE REPORT OF '1'11E 1994-1996 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON
SOCIAL SECURITY (1996) [hereinafter ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT]. The "modification"
proposals, supported by a majority of Advisory Council members would (1) extend Social
Security coverage to certain state and local government workers; (2) scale back the cost-of-
living adjustment; (3) increase from 35 to 38 the number of working years taken into ac-
count in computing benefit levels; (4) accelerate the scheduled increases in normal re-
tirement age: and (5) include benefits (net of the employee's share of payroll taxes previ-
ously paid) in the recipient's gross income and add the resulting revenue to the trust
hinds. See id. at 15-21. These proposals would have eliminated two-thirds of the then-
projected long-term deficit in Social Security; under current projections based on the most
recent estimates, discussed below, these proposals might be sufficient to eliminate the en-
tire deficit.
8 Governor Bush has issued his proposal fOr partial privatization of Social Security in
very general outlines on his web site devoted to the topic. See Republican Party, Social Secu-
rity Blueprint (visited Sept. 24, 2000)Chttp://www.bItteprintforffiefuture.com >, While it is
difficult to discern the precise contours of his proposal, the plan apparently contains sonic
version of private savings accounts for individual workers, into which some portion of the
current payroll tax revenues—perhaps one to two percent—would be diverted. See Robert
I). Ifersheyk, From Gore and Bush, Uncooked Retirement Stew, N.Y. ItmEs, June 25, 2000, at 3-
14.
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privatization and made preservation of Social Security a central theme
of his campaign. 9
 Thus, Social Security bids to be a major focus of the
new Administration and Congress in 2001.
The almost unspoken underlying goals of all of this concern
about economic well-being in retirement are individual autonomy
and the rejection of dependency, which in many ways are the hall-
mark American values that informs all public policy. 19 Even those pub-
lic programs that by definition operate through a dependency rela-
tionship—such as unemployment payments and welfare benefits for
mothers with children—are touted as tools for ultimately reducing or
eliminating dependent),
 through re-integration of the beneficiaries
into the work force." Aesop's ant represents the quintessential inde-
pendent individual who through hard work and thrift provides for
g Vice President Gore proposes to maintain Social Security essentially in its current
form and in addition proposes a supplemental plan to provide tax credits for, amounts
workers would save in individual accounts. See Hershey, supra note 8, at 3-14.
LO See, e.g., Richard H. Pikies, My Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive
Harms, and Constitutionalism, 271 LEGAL STUD. 725,727-28 (1998). Nicks states:
Much of American constitutional law is, of course, cast in the language of
protecting individual rights: rights to free speech, or to equal protection, or
to democratic participation—to vote, form parties, petition the govern-
ment.... lu the canonical text of rights-oriented liberalism, Taking Rights
Seriously, Dworkin argued that rights protect individual interests by excluding
appeals to the common good (majoritarian preferences) as a justification for
hunting rights... Rights must permit individuals to take an action "even if the
majority would be worse off for having it done." This is the picture of the di-
rect clash between the interests of individuals (in liberty, or dignity, or auton-
omy) and that of the community, with rights trumping the second to secure
the first.... Dissenters from the recent efflorescence of constitutionalism in
other countries have similarly echoed this critique of rights-oriented constitu-
tionalism. For example, since the advent of the Charter of Rights and Free-
doms in 1982, sonic Canadians have found the specter of Canadian constitu-
tionalism uninviting, based on their perception of the American experience.
Allan Hutchinson, a constitutional theorist, appeals to Canadians to reject
constitutionalism altogether because a "rights-centred society becomes little
more than an aggregate of self-interested individuals who band together to
facilitate the pursuit of their own uncoordinated and independent life proj-
ects—a relation of strategic convenience and opportunism rather than mu-
tual commitment and support." Charles Taylor, the philosopher, asserts that
Canadian culture has traditionally been organized around the model of citi-
zen participation and that the American model of rights poses a threat to that
ft-atilt ion.
Id. at 727-28 (citation omitted).
rr See generallyJOEL. F. HANDLER & LUCIE WHITE, HARD LABOR: WOMEN AND WORK IN
THE POST WELFARE ERA (1999).
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herself without assistance and assures herself an unassailable entitle-
ment to consumption when work is no longer possible.
The savings behavior epitomized by Aesop's ant is the path urged
not only by those who would "privatize" the currently public entitle-
ment of Social Security but also by those who support maintaining the
program. Many defenders of the existing program assume that public
equity in the form of advance funding through the payroll tax—as
opposed to the private equity model of the private account propo-
nents—is a possible and desirable basis for retirement as it has been
entrenched in American society over the last half-century. 12
 I propose
in this article an alternative way of thinking about the problem of re-
tirement income—one that rejects the assumption that adequate pro-
vision for retirement can rely on accumulated equity, either private or
public, and that challenges the ideological messages imbedded in the
current debate over how best to provide for the elderly who no longer
work.
Social Security is a publicly defined, permanent and direct claim
on—that is, a public entitlement to—some portion of future produc-
tivity, in the form of a stream of income at some point, either at or
after the established retirement age, when each individual chooses to
stop working. Indeed, the current formulation of the Social Security
benefit calculation, based on a wage-indexed earnings record that
brings old wages to current dollar levels at the time the calculation is
made, guarantees that the retired worker's share of GNP in retire-
ment will reflect her income position at the point immediately before
retirement. 13 This is a dynamic, rather than a static measurement. It is
the assured permanence of the public entitlement to consumption,
the guarantee of lifetime benefits that substantially reflect economic
growth both before and after retirement, that enables workers at
lower and middle income levels to take the risk of stopping work in
early old age. The push to privatize Social Security represents an at-
tempt to take this public claim private—fundamentally changing not
12 See/ALICIA H. MIINNELL, INTRODUCTION TO FRAmING THE SOCIAL. SECURITY DEBATE:
VALUES, POLErIcs, AND ECONOMICS 1-2 (R. Douglas Arnold et al. eds., 1998).
" Social Security old age benefits are calculated fOr workers born after 1928 and retir-
ing in 1991 or later using the highest 35 years of earnings up to the year in which the
worker turns 62. Because the earnings records of prospective retirees arc wage-indexed,
Intl is, itixlated to current dollar levels in the year the worker reaches age 62, the benefit
for la is applied to an earnings record reflecting economic growth over the worker's
lifetime. Once the beneficiary begins receiving benefits, the annual cost of living increase
guarantees the retiree at least an update in purchasing power, if not a full share of eco-
nomic growth after retirement. See 42 U.S.C. § 415(i) (1994).
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the overall size of the problem of support for the elderly generally,
but rather, the size and income distribution of individual claims on
future productivity.
Social Security also represents a spreading of individual claims
across the generation -
 of producing workers and a redistribution of
income from high to low-wage workers and from the working to the
non-working retired generation.' 4
 In contrast, privatization constitutes
a return to individual responsibility and risk and an apparent rejec-
tion of redistribution. 15
 As a result, if the entitlement to retirement
income represented by Social Security was the foundation of mass re-
tirement in the twentieth century, privatization very possibly would
represent the end of the retirement expectation in the twenty-first
century for all but the fortunate and the well-off who have weathered
the economic risks that priVate accounts inevitably entail. 16
14 See Eugene C. Stetter & Jon AI. Bakija, bow Social Security Redistributes Income, 62
TAx No'rEs 1763, 1764 (1994) ("Social Security is the largest transfer program in the
United States, each year redistributing hundreds of billions of dollars between genera-
tions. It also reallocates the shares of income enjoyed by different income groups within
each generation.") The limits of redistribution within the Social Security system as cur-
rently structured are well documented, and its shortcomings, particularly with respect to
the differential benefits provided under the system to minority and women workers and to
non-traditional family units, are important issues for discussion. It should be noted that
the Social Security benefit system (and the assumptions of its founders that it would make
most needs-based welfare obsolete) is based on assumptions about equal and free access to
all levels of the paid labor force that may be admirable aspirations but that probably do
not reflect reality for African-American, Latino and other minority workers, as well as to
some extent for women generally. That problem is one of structure of the American econ-
omy and work force and is probably not possible to address within the structure of Social
Security itself. In contrast, the problem, of a benefit structure based on traditional family
taints is certainly amenable to resolution within the structure of the earned right entitle-
ment concept. These issues, however, are beyond the scope of this article, although their
resolution wool(' likely be perfectly consistent with the discussion below of the importance
of redistributive entitlements in the retirement context.
15 See AARON El' AL., SUM Dole 7, at 117-20.
16
 The history of the institution of retirement has been examined in some detail over
the last 20 years. See, e.g., WILLIAM GRAMMER, A HISTORY OF RETIREMENT 14 (1980). See
generally THE COUNTRYSIDE IN TnE AGE OF CAPITALIST FORMATION: ESSAYS IN THE SOCIAL
HISTORY Or RURAL AMERICA (Steven Hahn & Jonathan Prude eds., 1985); THE EVOLUTION
OF RETIREMENT: AN AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY 1880-1990 (1998); CAROLE HABER &
BRIAN GRATTON, OW AGE AND THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY: AN AMERICAN SOCIAL HIS-
TORY (1994); DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, GROWING OLD IN AMERICA (1978). However, the
future of retirement as au institution of the lower and middle classes, not simply of those
with private means to support leisure in middle and old age, has not received much atten-
tion in the current Social Security debate. This is a discussion that needs to he conducted
and will be the focus of a future article; however, this article is confined to an analysis of
the current debate over Social Security and how best to finance the existing institution of
retirement.
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The problem with basing retirement systems on the equity model
is that equity inevitably involves risk of loss or inadequate Value, either
of which might result in an insufficient future stream of income.
These risks are intrinsically incompatible with the modern institution
of mass retirement, regardless of individual willingness to undertake
risky investment in order to have;a chance at immoderate. gain. None-
theless, if the issue were simply a question of each individual's provi-
sion for her own old age, the American cultural imperative of
autonomous action in a free market economy might sway 'the national
(if not the global) debate in favor of individual risk-taking in a privat-
ized personal account system.
However, since the onset of industrialization in the nineteenth
century, and especially since World War II, retirement has become
much more than an individual option available to the well-off minor-
ity. The social policy of retirement was actively promoted both by pri-
vate employers and public support systems. In the post World War II
era it became a cultural institution in its own right, satisfying public,
private, individual and corporate fleeds. 17 Social Security was designed
as the cornerstone of this social policy, not only as insurance for indi-
viduals against their own economic need, but more importantly as a
solution for the social instability threatened in times of economic cri-
sis by inequality of economic opportunity during a working
The program's guaranteed income redistributive benefit formula
promotes prevention rather than alleviation of poverty in old age and
extends the expectation of retirement to all income levels. Thus, the
argument over whether to "privatize" Social Security is in reality a de-
bate over the future of mass retirement itself. While no one advocat-
ing privatization has so far admitted it publicly, such proposals consti-
tute a step in the direction of eliminating middle class retirement as a
labor force management tool, substituting in its place an economic
old age lottery in which retirement would once again become a hope
rather than an expectation.
The institution of mass retirement, I argue here, can realistically
only he supported by a public entitlement to an income stream when
full-time paid employment ends. 19 Only a public entitlement directly
to a share of economic productivity at the time it is necessary to sup-
port consumption, as opposed to a private equity investment with
17 See infra notes 199-235 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 199-235 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 270-283 and accompanying text.
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variable economic returns, can induce the cessation of work on a mass
scale and the continued democratization of retirement as an expecta-
tion of workers at all income levels. It is not a question of whether we
have sufficient socio-economic resources to support retirement—it is
a question of how those resources are to be distributed.
The discussion of Social Security and retirement income security
has focused, in many ways, on the concrete results of privatization
proposals as if those results were both measurable and predictable. In
fact, both the advantages and disadvantages of privatization are a mat-
ter of long-term economic and demographic estimates and political
opinion, rather than of science. Thus, a principal purpose of this Ar-
ticle is to set aside the essentially uncertain predictions about the con-
sequences of privatization and to refocus the debate on the real po-
litical and theoretical disagreements at issue.
The most interesting aspect of this debate may be the enduring
power and ultimately limiting impact of the ideology of private prop-
erty rights for both proponents of privatization and for supporters of
redistributive entitlements." The expression of all rights as a form of
property ultimately leads to a dead end in which individual autonomy
"trumps" socially conceived solutions to socially defined problems."
The terms in which the Social Security debate has been framed dis-
guise the real argument, which is about the supremacy of market ide-
ology, concomitant resistance to redistribution of income, and the
transformation of all social rights and values into species of private
property. 22
Such a framework for legal analysis is the theoretical and ideo-
logical expression of the "winner take all" character of early twenty-
first century market capitalism. Social Security can be seen as a coun-
terweight to the excesses of "pure" market capitalism. Indeed, I would
argue that it is quite necessary to the functioning of the market sys-
tem not, as privatization advocates appear to believe, antithetical to
it."
The debate over Social Security and privatization is a struggle not
just about private investment versus socialized responsibility but about
ways of thinking about how the problem of old age income support
20 See infra notes 267-283 and accompanying text.
sr See Pildes, supra note 10, at 727-28.
22 See infra notes 143-144 and accompanying text.
23
 For a thorough discussion of the distorting effects of "Winner take all" economics in
the setting of the income tax, see generally Martin J. McMahon & Alice Abreo, Winner-
Take-All Markets: Easing the Case for Progressive Taxation, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 1 (1998).
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should be framed and the invasion of all aspects of life by the profit
imperative. Encouraging thrift and savings, in the manner of Aesop's
ant, is in itself a relatively benign prescription. In contrast to the cur-
rent preoccupation of the media and.policy analysts, however, I would
argue that being and thinking like a money manager—the role con-
stantly urged on the public by advertisers and politicians—should not
be a prerequisite for participation in society and security in old age
and in fact is likely to be a hindrance to the creation of a more secure
and humane society for more than the privileged few. 24
This Article will explore the theoretical, rhetorical and ideologi-
cal foundations of the Social Security privatization debate, It will
demonstrate that what is frequently portrayed as a numbers problem
to which a "correct" answer can be found is in fact an ideological and
political argument about wealth building versus direct income sup-
port and about the reality and security of public entitlement as op-
posed to private property rights. 25 First, I explore arguments pre-
sented by those who advocate a private account system as a
replacement for Social Security, examining both the criticisms of So-
cial Security itself and the suggested advantages of a private system
over the public system. This analysis shows that an attachment to the
principle of private property as the source of economic rights is the
common element in all of the arguments made and that, in the ab-
sence of compelling economic evidence supporting privatization, the
real argument is a political and ideological one about public versus
private rights and income rights versus wealth accumulation.
Next, I discuss the problems inherent in using the idea of private
property as the basis of rights in the context of the establishment and
explanation of the Social Security system itself and in the context of
non-retirement social welfare programs proposed in the work of Char-
les Reich and others, 26 In light of the failure of the courts to expand
on Reich's notion of welfare as property, succeeding analysts have at-
tempted to develop a different justification for redistributive justice—
one that sees actual property redistribution as a way to insure access to
24 For an example of the current preoccupation with inducing widespread participa-
tion in investing and the stock market, see James A. Panto, We're Al Capitalists Now: The
Importance, Nature, Provision and Regulation of Investor Education, 49 ClAsx W. RES. L. REV,
105,107 (1008).
25 See infra Hates 143-172 and accompanying text.
26 See generally Charles 11. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) [hereinafter
Reich, New Property],
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civic and economic opportunity. 27
 The failure of these efforts as well
as the misleading private pension analogy used to sell the Social Secu-
rity program from the New Deal forward are directly attributable to
the distorting effect of the insistence on individual property rights as
the basis for economic rights.28
Finally, I set forth an alternative analysis of economic rights in the
retirement context, suggesting that Social Security, far from being a
quaint, retrograde souvenir of the New Deal, in fact was ahead of its
time in creating economic rights based on effort rather than equity in
support of the public institution of broad-based retirement. 29 As ideas
about the nature of property itself continue to change, particularly in
the context of technological developments such as the Internet,
property and .ownership may give ground to effort and access as the
basis of economic rights in the future. 39
 In any event, I propose that
the public entitlement of Social Security is indispensable if the institu-
tion of retirement, which fundamentally relies on each individual's
permanent entitlement to income until death as a way to induce that
individual to stop working, is to last very far into the twenty-first cen-
tury.
I. THE PRIVATIZATION ARGUMENT: SMART MONEY
The debate over "privatizing" Social Security, in one form or an-
other, has been raging for at least thirty years since Martin Feldstein's
theories on the effects of Social Security on the national savings rate
first began to garner attention. 81
 Each side in policy discussions about
the future of public retirement programs tends to cast the argument
as one about demonstrable truths—numbers of elderly workers, ef-
fects of public transfer programs on investment, savings and the
economy, etc. The introduction of Social Security into the 2000 presi-
dential campaign in the form of George W. Bush's partial privatiza-
27 See infra notes 188-189 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 184-266 and accompanying text.
2° See infra notes 271-287 and accompanying text.
3°
 For a discussion of the struggles to delimit property rights on the Web, see generally
Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace.. The New Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights Management," 97
Mtcn. L. Rev. 462 (1998), and Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace
and Folk Tales, Emission 'nodes and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129 (1998).
51
 Martin S. Feldstein, Social Security, Induced Retirement and Aggregate Capital Accumula-
tion, 82 J. Poi. ECON. 905 (1974) [hereinafter Feldstein, Social Security).
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Lion proposal speaks volumes for the continuing vitality of the de-
bate."
However demonstrable some of the truths appear to be, the ar-
gument is far from settled and economists differ among themselves,
as do policy makers generally, as to the economic effects of social in-
surance and the costs and benefits of private savings as an alternative
to social insurance. 33 It is the subtext of this debate that is more inter-
esting and illuminating. The ideological, philosophical and cultural
underpinnings of both sides of the argument reveal common goals
and, more importantly, common conceptions about rights and eco-
nomic entitlements held both by those who would privatize Social Se-
curity and those who would preserve it as it is today. For purposes of
mapping this "deep structure" of the privatization argument, I focus
first on the basic tenets of the case for privatization, as argued in vari-
ous representative pieces by political and academic figures, examining
both the arguments made and the principles and rhetoric in which
those arguments. are grounded.34
A number of versions of the privatization case have been made
over the last several years, and all are based on the same general
proposition: individual accounts invested in equities (principally the
stock market) are superior as a retirement income system to the pub-
lic income transfer entitlement.3 3 As will be clear in the discussion
that follows, there is no conclusive or universally accepted economic
argument to settle the issue. Thus, it would be easy to dismiss the en-
tire debate as "political" and to attribute motives of bald self-interest
to each side: opposition to redistribution and a "winner takes all" un-
bridled greed on the part of the privatization advocates and self-
interested preservation of government subsidies for the elderly on the
part of supporters of Social Security. Clearly such motives are present
on each side, but they are not the whole story. It is possible, by peel-
ing back the layers of the most commonly presented arguments in
32 See Hershey, supra note 8, at 14. Columnists have weighed in on both sides'. See, e.g.,
Molly Ivies, Social Security Plan Depends on Details Bush MO Divulge, MINNEAPOLIS STAR-
TRIBUNE, May 26, 2000, at A23; William Satire, Grab Tlurt Third Bail, N.Y. TimEs, June 26,
2000, at A17.
"Karen Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Thivatizing Social Security: Eight Myths, 74 TAx
NOTES 1167, 1167-73 (1997).
14 See generally FELDSTEIN, REFORM, supra note 7; Solomon & Barrow, supra now 7; Dun
Nickles, Policy Essay: Retiring in America: li.ky the United Stales Needs a New Kind of Social Secu-
rity for the Nero Millennium, 36 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 77 (1999).
" See generally FELDS•EIN, REMRA•, supra note 7; Solomon & Barrow, supra note 7;
Nickles, supra note 34.
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favor of privatization, to see the bones of the debate—core beliefs
about property, economic tights and individual autonomy—that both
unite and divide the contestants.
A. The Privatization Critique of Social Security
The critics' analyses of the inadequacies of the social insurance
system focus both on internal design flaws that make the system in-
adequate to meet the retirement needs (they argue) of the twenty-first
century and on apparent effects of the program on the economy and
society as a whole. Most criticisms fall into four general categories.
First, there is concern about the coming demographic "disaster" of
the baby boom generation's retirement, with fewer workers to fund
more retirees who can be expected to live longer lives," Second, there
are "rate of return" issues (that is, comparison of taxes paid to
benefits paid out to each individual) with concern focused on Social
Security's inefficiency in targeting benefits, the inadequacy of benefits
for the low-paid as well as for some of the high-paid, and its combina-
tion of Insurance" and "welfare" functions." Third, there is concern
about the overall expense of paying for Social Security and the share
of the federal budget (and national economy) that will be devoted to
income maintenance programs for the elderly and the problem of
Social Security's "unfunded liability."38 Fourth, there is concern that a
publicly funded retirement program, financed on a pay-as-you-go ba-
sis, discourages private savings for retirement."
The first and third areas of concern deal with the financing of
retirement on a generational basis. The second focuses on "equity
versus adequacy," a long-standing debate about the redistributive So-
cial Security benefit structure. The fourth area of concern, the de-
pression of the national savings rate, deals not with how well Social
Security meets the goals of insuring retirement, but rather, with the
detrimental effects of public income transfer programs generally. 40
These economic and demographic arguments, however, are only the
outward manifestations of the same set of assumptions and con-
cerns—an atomistic, individualized approach to problems created by
demographic and social phenomena (an aging population in the in-
36 See infra notes 41-79 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 80-109 and accompanying text..
" See infra notes 110-130 and accompanying text.
39 See infra notes 131-144 and accompanying text.
40
 Feldstein was the fitst to propose this effect primarily for Social Security. See generally
Feldstein, Social Security, supra note 31.•
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dustrialized world coupled with the cultural expectation of retirement
at age sixty-five) and a related attachment to individual property
rights (and resistance to redistribution of them) as the only sure
source of economic growth and security during working life and in
old age.
1. Baby Boom Retirement Disaster
For many who advocate private accounts as a viable substitute for
Social Security, the system's problems largely originate with the aging
of the baby boom generation—the demographic basketball in the py-
thon." The generation born roughly from 1946 through 1960 in the
industrialized world greatly outnumbers the generations born in the
1920s and 1930s and during the war years of the 1940s; as a result, the
ratio of workers supporting non-working elderly will drop from the
three workers for each retiree during the period from about 1960 to
2010 to two workers or fewer for each retiree by 2030. 42
The current Social Security financing structure is commonly de-
scribed as "pay-as-you-go," referring to the fact that the system is gen-
erally not funded in advance, Almost all of the payroll tax revenues
currently being collected from workers and their employers are used
to pay benefits in current pay status. Any surpluses, which the system
has generated each year since the late 1980s, is accounted for as a re-
serve in the Social Security trust funds, which are held in the form of
U.S. government bond obligations.49
The language used to describe the baby boom retirement phe-
nomenon frequently evokes the feeling of impending doom; in addi-
tion to the drop in the reproduction rate of the baby boomers them-
selves, increases in life expectancy and advances in medicine add up
to a demographic tidal wave of elderly retirees. 44 Senator Don Nickles
41 The fertility rate (number of children per woman) increased during the period of
1945 to 1960: See 2000 BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF TIIE FED, OLD-AGE & SURVIVORS INS. & FED.
DISABILITY INS. TRUST FUNDS., ANN. REP. 63 161.11.1)2 (2000) [hereinafter TRUSTEES' RE-
PORT].
42 Nickles, supra note 34, at 84.
43 See Burke & McCouch, supra note 33, at 1167-73.
44 See Philip j. Longtnan. Financing the Future: Is Social Security the Problem or the Solution?,
in SOCIAL SECURITY AND THE BUDGE'r PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST CONFERENCE Or THE
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SOCIAL INSURANCE 63-64 (Henry .). Aaron ed., 1990) (stating: "As
the ranks of the elderly swell in the next century, those of children will diminish.... %Vital
will happen when this anomalously large [baby boom] generation reaches old age, and
begins to consume far more than it produces?"); see also Peter 0. Peterson, The Morning
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focused on this worker-to-retiree ratio problem in a 1999 article advo-
cating private accounts as a substitute for Social Security:
The population of Americans aged sixty-five and over in-
creased eleven fold from 1900 to 1994, compared with only a
threefold increase of those under age sixty-five. The popula-
tion of those eighty-five and older will more than double be-
tween 1994 and 2020 to 7 million, and reach 19 million by
2050....
Social Security depends on today's workers to pay for to-
day's retirees. The future of the system and the benefits clue
today's workers in their retirement depends heavily on the
government's ability to tax future generations. Thus, under-
standing these changing demographics is key to understand-
ing why the system is in trouble."
The worker-to-retiree ratio is usually put forward as the first and
principal problem with the current Social Security system—that is, too
few workers paying in to support projected numbers of retirees. There
are many reasons for the projected drop (under the intermediate set
of assumptions) from the current 3.4 workers to each retiree down to
just over two workers for each retiree by 2030. 46 The large baby boom
generation is only part of the picture, of course. The substantial drop
in fertility rates between 1960 and 1976 coincided with the beginning
of widespread use of oral contraceptives and deferral of childbearing
by women now entering the paid work force in larger numbers. 47 For
a short while in the 1980s the baby boom generation was not even re-
placing itself, although fertility has rebounded in more recent projec-
tions."
These demographic issues are not confined to the United States;
Japan currently has the same worker-to-retiree ratio that the United
States will experience by 2020.49 Western European countries—which
After; ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 1997, at 43, 43-69. The subtitle of the article is Consuming
Our Children.
45 See Nickles, supra note 34, at 85 (citations omitted).
46 SeeTRUSTEES' REPORT, supra note 41, at 21-22.
47 See id. at 60, 63 tbl. 1I.D2. The fertility rate reached a peak of 3.61 in 1960, declining
to as low as 1.74 in 1976, but rising again to its current rate of 2.06 in 1999. See id. at 63
tbl.II.D2.
48 See id. at 60.
49 See AGING SOCIETIES 3 161:1-1 (Barry Bosworth & Gary Burtless eds., 1998) (finding
that the aged dependency ratio in 2000 is 25.1 in Japan, 18.7 itt United States, and in 2020
will be 43.2 in Japan, 24.8 in United States).
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long before the United States established more extensive social wel-
fare and social insurance programs dealing with a wide range of is-
sues—face similar demographics and, in sonic cases, more severe
drop-offs in birth rates than are projected in the United States.50
Many of these countries are beginning to question the resources de-
voted to their broad social welfare structures and to investigate private
market alternatives. 51
The demographic issue in the United States is normally pre-
sented as a question of simple, common sense math: if there are fewer
workers supporting each retiree, then the corresponding tax burden
on each worker will have to increase. The critique usually stops there,
the implicit corollary being that increasing taxes is per se wrong-
headed and economically disastrous, no matter what the reason. The
systemic criticism embedded in the demographic disaster narrative is
that a pay-as-you-go system, in which each generation of workers pays
for the retirement benefits of the then-current. generation of retirees,
cannot be sustained if the retiree generation constitutes an out-sized
burden on a comparatively smaller working generation.52
It is the way in which the demographic problem is framed and
explained that is of particular interest here: each worker's responsibil-
ity for supporting the non-working elderly is spelled out as a matter of
individual Lax burdens that she may or may not choose to undertake.
Solomon and Barrow write: "Each generation must finance its par-
ents' retirement on the faith that its children, in turn, will have the
benevolence and capacity to fulfill their social obligation." 55 Solomon
and Barrow make this statement as a specific criticism of Social Secu-
rity's financing mechanism in the face of what they imply is an im-
pending demographic disaster. The unstated assumption seems to be
that providing for elderly parents is a voluntary obligation that is
widely and freely rejected by children in both individual and social
contexts.
It is unclear, however, whether these demographic issues would in
any way be addressed by an equity-based retirement system supported
by these same critics as the necessary substitute for the pay-as-you-go
5° Sec id. at 4 MI.1-2 (finding the fertility rate in France was 1.8, in Germany was 1.3,
and in the United Kingdom was 1.8, compared to 2.1 in the United States, in 1990-95).
51 See Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: Stripping Social. Security of its Redistributive Features,
73 TAx NarEs 1012, 1015 (1996) [hereinafter Sheppard, News Analysis'.
52 See Solomon & Barrow, supra note 7, al 15.
57 Id.
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social insurance mode1.54
 A private account system must be based on
the assumption that a property right, an entitlement to equity
sufficient to support an income stream to the end of life, is necessary
to assure retirement income security. Privatization advocates are gen-
erally highly critical of the lost opportunity for wealth-building repre-
sented by FICA taxes used to pay Social Security benefits, money they
would rather keep and invest themselves to satisfy their own individual
retirement needs.55
Yet there seems to be no question that the nation as a whole will
have the capacity to produce sufficient goods and services to satisfy at
least the basic needs of all its working and non-working members
throughout their lives. Thus, the adequate care of elderly baby boom-
ers in the aggregate should be perfectly possible. The question is how
the benefits—that is, the share of consumable goods and services—
will be distributed among the elderly. Since in a pay-as-you-go system pay-
roll taxes pay for current consumption of goods and services by the
beneficiary population, those taxes would probably have to increase
to provide for a larger and longer-lived generation, unless productiv-
ity so greatly increased average wages that equivalent additional reve-
nue would be raised by the same tax rate. While the payroll tax is re-
gressive, higher wage workers nonetheless pay higher levels of FICA
taxes. Moreover, if additional revenue has to be raised within the pay-
roll tax structure, likely measures would include increasing the tax-
able wage base without a concomitant increase in benefits or using
some portion of general tax revenue raised by the progressive income
tax, both of which impose a greater burden on high income than on
low income taxpayers.56
54 See id.
55 For example, according to the Bosh campaign:
[1]nstead of dramatically raising taxes or cutting benefits, individual workers
could be permitted to establish personal retirement accounts. By allowing
younger workers to invest a portion of their payroll (axes in stocks and bonds,
these accounts will generate higher rates of return, thus helping to increase
retirement income for younger workers.... In addition to worsening rates of
return, the current structure of the Social Security system impedes, rather
tlnut enhances, wealth creation.
The Republican Party, A Blueprint to Strengthen and Improve Soda! Security (visited Sept. 28,
2000) Chtip://www.blueprintforthefitture.cont/pdfs/ssblueprint.pdf> [hereinafter Re-
publican Party, Blueprint].
w See generally Steven C. Wilber, ACCF Center for Policy Research Compares Social Security Re-
farm Proposals, 81 Tux NcrrEs 1667 (1908) (summarizing current reform proposals).
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It is not simply the prospect of more elderly retirees in itself that
necessarily alarms private account advocates. Rather, it is the likely
solutions for payroll tax shortfalls in providing benefits for those eld-
erly that create issues of fairness from their perspective. The impact of
additional taxes probably would fall more heavily on higher-wage
workers, inevitably resulting in a redistribution from the bard-working
ants to the less fortunate or (depending on your perspective) more
lazy grasshoppers of the human work force. 57 The demographic pro-
jections of a larger elderly population being supported by a working
generation that will he comparatiVely smaller than in the past create a
problem for privatization supporters because they imply higher tax
burdens on higher wage workersHa greater degree of redistribution
from higher income workers to lower income retirees. 55 Such redistri-
bution also contributes to the second general problem cited by priva-
tization supporters: the poor "rate of return" on payroll taxes paid
into Social Security as well as helping to diminish the private accumu-
lation of capital.59
Few supporters of Social Security argue with the range of projec-
tions contained in the annual Trustees' Report, which is based on
three sets of demOgraphic (and economic) assumptions: the low-cost,
or optimistic set; the - intermediate set, which are the figures used by
most government , policymakers to make decisions on Social Security
issues; and the high-cost, or pessimistic, set of assumptions. 60 For pur-
poses of determining actions affecting the next thirty years, current
and past fertility and mortality rates, unlike most of the other issues in
the privatization debate, are primarily a matter of calculation, not
judgment. The generation that will reach what have traditionally been
considered peak earning years at the time the baby boom generation
is due to retire has already been born. Therefore, calculating how
many workers there will be for each retiree in the 2015-2035 period is
a matter more of mortality rates of both generations than of birth
rates. 61
However, there are many demographic factors and uncertainties
that may play a significant role in determining how many workers will
be bearing the payroll tax burden for Social Security in the longer
> 57 StrAARON ET Al.., supra note 7, at 117.
66 See Gene Stetterlc, The Simple Aritlinulic Driving Social Security Reform, 78 TAx NorEs
377,377-78 (1998).
66 See infra notes 80-109 and accompanying text.
c.° SeeTRUSTEES' REPORT, supra note 41, at 19-29.
61 See id. at 21-22 fig.1.G2.
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term future, and the choice among even minor variations on these
assumptions can make all the difference in the projected size of the
financial problems of the system. For example, the extent of future
immigration into the United States is a critical, yet somewhat unpre-
dictable, factor. While the industrialized Western European, Asian
and North American populations are aging, the populations in other
parts of Asia, and most of Africa and the Middle East, as well as parts
of South and Central America, are experiencing much higher fertility
rates and have much younger populations. 62 As a result, it can be ar-
gued that one approach the industrialized nations can take is to allow
immigration of younger workers to make up for any dearth of native
born • workers and, as. a result, shore up the total payroll tax wage
base.63
 The United States, despite its heritage as a "nation of immi-
grants," historically has alternated periods of xenophobia with periods
of relaxed immigration standards to meet industrial and agricultural
labor needs."
Even if the conservative immigration assumptions contained in
the 2000 Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age & Survival Insur-
ance & Federal Disability Income Trust Fund Annual Report ("2000
Trustees' Report") are accepted, there are nonetheless several factors
that may indicate less than catastrophic consequences of the aging of
America .66
 First, the math is really not as simple as it appears, as the
payroll tax is not a head tax but rather a tax on wages and thus indi-
rectly on productivity. It is clearly a regressive tax, as it applies the
same percentage rate to all wage levels and does not tax wages above
the taxable wage base at all. However, if productivity increases and
wages rise, as most economists would expect to happen when there
are fewer workers in the labor force, the impact of any tax increase
needed to cover rising outlays in Social Security benefits will be less
severe. Such expectations are part of the low-cost or optimistic set of
the 2000 Trustees' Report assumptions, under which Social Security
62 See POPULATION DIVISION OF THE U.N. SECRETARIAT, WORLD FERTILITY PA•rEuNs
1997, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/SER.A/165 (1997), available in World Fertility Patterns 1997 (vis-
ited No 6, 2000)<Iittp://www.undp.org/popin/wdtrends/fer/fermap.litin >.
63 Id. at 37-38. ("Increased immigration affects the cost of Social Security much like
increases in birth or mortality rates—it increases the ratio of workers to retirees.").
64
 For a thorough exploration of the uses and misuses of immigration laws and chang-
ing conceptions of citizenship in America, see generally ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS:
CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY (1997).
65 See TRusTEEs' REPORT, supra note 41,.at 13, 62, 63, 64.
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incurs no significant financial problems throughout the 75-year pro-
jection period, 66 •
Of course, the payroll tax has for the last several years raised far
more revenue than necessary to pay for current benefits, and the sur-
plus amounts have been recorded as accumulated in the Social Secu-
rity trust funds.° The extended debate over the existence- or unreality
of these trust funds is outside the focus of this Article, but clearly the
federal budget has been "balanced" in recent years through the use of
payroll tax revenues to offset the deficit in general income and excise
tax revenues. 68 Once the payroll tax ceases to be sufficient to pay for
current outlays—depending on economic assumptions, that may be-
gin to occur as early as 2015--these accumulated surpluses will have
to be "drawn down" to pay for benefits.° 9 In effect, in order to keep
the overall federal budget balanced, income and other tax revenues
will have to be used to pay off the bonds in which the trust fund sur-
pluses are held and which will have to be liquidated to pay current
benefits."
But these issues are clearly a question of political choices, not of
demographics. The solutions to almost all of the problems potentially
arising from an increasing elderly population, in fact, are political and
philosophical since the demographics are simply phenomena with
which our political and social systems must cope. The increase in pay-
roll tax rates that may be necessary to sustain the current Social Secu-
rity system past 2030, essentially until the baby boom generation
passes from the scene, seems inherently distasteful to many critics,
even apart from any ancillary economic effects such increased taxes
might create. Yet, under the intermediate assumptions in the 2000
Trustees' Report, a tax increase today of slightly more than one per-
centage point on employers and employees alike would cover the sys-
tem's shortfalls for the remainder of the seventy-five-year projection
66 See id. at 22-27; see also AARON ET AL., Pip/ note 7, at 11. See generally ALICIA
MUNNELL, THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS (1982).
67 See Barry Bosworth, 117rat Economic Role for the Trust Funds?, in SOCIAL SEcuRr'ry IN
Tni.; 21sT CENTURY 156-177 (Eric R. Kingson James 1-1. Schulz, eds., 1997).
68 See Robert Ball, hind on Formulating a Deficit Reduction Package: What Is the Role of So-
cial Security? First Presentation, in SOCIAL SECURITY AND THE BUDGET PROCEEDINGS OF Ti IE
FIRST CONFERENCE OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SOCIAL INSURANCE 123, 127-128
(Henry .). Aaron ed., 1990) (discussing how surpluses in Social Security were used to re-
duce the federal deficit).
69 SeeTRUSTEES .
 REPORT, supra note 41, at 25.
ro SeeBosworth, supra note 67, at 160.
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period—a distasteful option, perhaps, but hardly cataclysmic.," A per-
haps more likely scenario would involve a combination of measures
including raising the taxable wage base, using some general tax reve-
nues, and increasing coverage, which together would reduce the size
of any payroll tax increase necessary to cover shortfalls. 72 The point is
that the demographic picture in itself is not a prediction of doom.
A second point that complicates the demographic picture is the
question of the overall dependency ratio—that is, the comparison of
numbers of workers to all non-workers, not just the elderly. 75
 The de-
pendency ratio takes into account non-working children (generally
those under eighteen) as well as non-working retirees in determining
what percentage of the gross national product (GNP) must be shared
with the non-producing sector of the population. The overall de-
pendency ratio in 1960 was higher than it will be at any point in the
seventy-five-year forecast period for Social Security; once again, the
baby boom generation was the cause—this time in childhood rather
than in old age. 74 While payroll tax rates in 1960 were relatively mod-
est by current standards, the income tax rate structure was much
more sharply progressive, with the highest marginal rates standing at
90% 75 Although the total dependency ratio may rise again to the lev-
els it reached in the 1960s, the total tax burden will probably look
quite different if today's much higher payroll tax rates and much
lower marginal income tax rates remain in place. Adjustments in the
way Social Security benefits are financed may indeed be in order to
reduce the effect of the regressive payroll tax. However, whatever ad-
71 See TRUSTEES' REPORT, MOM note 41, at 24 tbl.I.G.2. Under the intermediate as-
sumptions, the 75-year actuarial deficit is –1.89. Thus, an increase of .95%, from 6.2% to
7.15%, beginning in 2001, would eliminate the projected long-term deficit, taking into
account trust fund surpluses that would be accumulated until around 2018. See id.
72 See Bosworth, supra note 67, at 175 ("The combination of a tax increase to restore
actuarial balance and a mildly more aggressive investment policy could essentially elimi-
nate future financing problemS. While Social Security is a large share of the government
budget as currently presented, it is a small element in the total economy.").
" Dependency ratios generally meastire the number of persons in the society not en-
gaged in producing output relative to those in the labor force who are—that is, the num-
ber of non-workers who must be economically supported by the working populations. See
JAMES H. SCHULZ, THE ECONOMICS OF AGING 269 (6th ed. 1995).
71 See Theodore Marmor et al., Social Security Politics and the Conflict Between Generations:
Ate Ile Asking the Right Questions?, in SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY, simple note 67,
at 195-207, 201.
" See HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM,
11.R. REP. No. 103-17, at 64-65 031.1 (1993) (showing top marginal tax rate of 91 or 92%
throughout the period 1950-63, dropping to 77% for 1964, and 70% for 1965-67. The top
marginal rate did not fall as low as 50% until 1982).
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justments might ultimately be made, the more general point is that
demographics alone need not impel fiscal collapse, either public or
private.
In addition,. the conclusion that the demographics spell disaster
for Social Security is based on the unstated assumption that retire-
ment, like aging, is an inevitable stage of human life; hence, larger .
numbers of elderly necessarily means larger numbers of retirees draw-
ing benefits from the program. Yet as lifespans increase, and the pe-
riod of healthy capacity for work increases, it seems unreasonable to
assume that most older Americans will continue to want to retire as
young as the current retirement pattern of sixty-two to sixty-five, even
if they have the financial resources to do so." The age at which full
Social Security benefits will be available is now increasing, in small
annual increments, to age sixty-seven by the year 2022, and improve-
ments in mortality and health in old age, as well as potential labor
shortages, may further encourage older people to stay in the work
force longer."
Finally, and probably most importantly, it is unclear exactly what
a private account system in place of Social Security would do to solve
the demographic issue. If the issue is presented as a question of too
many retirees for too few workers, eliminating the burden-sharing sys-
tem of social insurance and placing responsibility for retirement sav-
ings on each indiVidual would change the distribution of the burden,
but not its overall, size. Privatization of Social Security cannot be pre-
sented as a solution to the issue of too many retirees; that problem
can only be addressed direCtly by encouraging the baby boom genera-
tion to work longer, perhaps through elimination or severe reductions
of benefits at age' sixty-eight or seventy." Why, then, do privatization
advocates stress the problems pdsed for the Social Security system by
the increasing numbers of elderly expected over the next fifty years?
While privatization cannot directly resolve the issue of too many
retirees (and certainly its advocates do not use that as a selling point),
a system of private accounts may indirectly discourage retirement by
eliminating income security and redistribution. The uncertainty of
having sufficient assets to insure lifelong income—an uncertainty that
is inherent in an equity-based retirement system—is very likely to re-
sult in longer working lives, as was the case before the enactment of
76
 Harold Sheppard, The United Stales: The Privatization of Exit, in TIME FOR RETIREMENT
252,259-260 (Martin Will et al. eds., 1991).
77 See id. at 277-78.
78 See id. at 278-79
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Social Security. Moreover, without even the modest redistribution of
income provided through the Social Security benefit formula, the risk
of insufficient retirement income will almost certainly be borne by
low and average wage workers.
In summary, demography may not be destiny, but fertility and
longevity patterns will clearly affect retirement patterns and how
twenty-first century societies will support their elderly. Nonetheless,
upon closer examination, the disasters privatization advocates fear
seem to be less demographic and more political in nature. In both
historic and economic terms, the working generation must always
bear the burden of providing goods and services to satisfy the
claims—expressed either as private savings or public entitlements--of
the non-working, both the elderly and the young. Private account
proposals, as well as less,extreme proposals to invest part of the Social
Security trust funds in stock market equities, in many ways hold out a
false hope that the burdens of aging can somehow be paid for in ad-
vance and shifted away from the generation who will be working at
the time the baby boom retires.
The only way to reduce the financial burden of supporting non-
working members of society on each producing generation as a mat- .
ter of demographics is to reduce the numbers of the non-working by
either having fewer children (the baby boomers' solution) or delaying
retirement (perhaps the baby boomers' fate). If neither of these steps
is taken, then the issue becomes one of distribution of the burdens
and the benefits across the working generation. A private account sys-
tem would resolve the distributional issue in faVor of the highly paid
and at the expense of the low wage worker who currently benefits
from the redistributive Social Security benefit formula. 79
2. Rate of Return
For many critics, the most intractable problem inherent in the
design of Social Security, and the one for which establishment of pri-
vate accounts is generally offered as a direct solution, is the "rate of
return" issue.8° Social Security's benefit and financing structure has
79 See Steuerle & Bakija, supra note 14, at 1770 (discussing how under the current sys-
tem low to moderate income peOple will be better off and high income individuals will be
worse off); see also AARON ET AL.; Stipra note 7, at 117-18 (switching to privatization would
eliminate the possibility of paying extra benefits to workers whose earnings were low and
would increase welfare applications).
80 See, e.g., Nickles, supra note 34, at 96 (arguing that historical data and projections for
the future show Social Security has a much lower rate of return than private markets).
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frequently been compared to that of a defined benefit employer pen-
sion with required employee contributions.81 The usual way of de-
scribing this structure is as follows: each worker in employment cov-
ered by Social Security and her employer pay each year, in equal
shares, a fixed percentage of the first $72,000 or so of her wages-
6.2% each, or a total of 12.4%—in exchange for the payment of a
lifetime annuity to the worker beginning at age 65 (later for those
retiring in 2000 and beyond). 82 ,While the Social Security program
also provides for spousal and survivor benefits in the event of the
worker's death and for disability insurance coverage until the worker
reaches retirement age, most workers, as well as the commentators
criticizing the system's rate of return, generally assess the system's
value to them as a retirement system.88
Social Security is funded by a dedicated payroll tax, and the gov-
ernment is required under the Social Security Act to publish an as-
sessment each year of the system's short, medium and long-term
financial status, as a comparison of projected payroll tax revenues
against program outlays. 84 As a result, the program is now embedded
in public consciousness and in the thinking of policy analysts as a self-
contained fiscal entity for which separate funding and expenditure
comparisons are appropriately made each year. These annual assess-
ments have consistently shown long term shortfalls in revenues based
on the current tax rates and conservative to moderate economic as-
sumptions.85 It is these assessments, combined with the short-term
financing problems of the late 1970s and early 1980s, that provided
much of the impetus for calls for private alternatives to Social Secu-
rity. These arguments for Social Security privatization usually compare
81 The original description of the Social Security program in the Report of the Com-
mittee on Economic Security in 1935 reflects this thinking: "A contributory annuity system,
mill enable younger workers,...to build up gradually their rights to annuities in their old
age." litport to the President of the Committee on Economic Security, in •riF, REPORT OF THE COM-
MITTEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY OF 1935, at 45 (1935) [hereinafter CES REPoirr].
B2
 This is only the OASDI rate, financing the Old Age and Survivors' insurance (OAS1)
and Disability Insurance (DI) programs. The remaining 1.45% of the FICA tax is (Or the
Health insurance (111). or Medicare program. The Federal Insurance Contributions Act
requires that employers and employees each "contribute" 6.2% of wages, up to a maxi-
mum taxable wage base, indexed for inflation to finance old-age survivor and disability
benefits. 26 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3102 (1999). The taxable wage base was equal to $76,200 in
2000. See TRUSTEES' REPORT, supra note 41, at 34-35 (listing the taxable wage base for each
year from 1937 through 2000).
" See Sheppard, News Analysis, supra note 51, at 1012-13.
84 42 U.S.C. § 401 (1999).
55 See Solomon & Barrow, supra note 7, at 15-16.
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the wealth-creation potential of private accounts with a small or even
negative "rate of return" under the public program, 86
For example, Senator Nickles bases the argument for private ac-
counts on the opportunity for wealth building in the private system in
contrast to the low return on investment offered by the public system:
Long-term savings should yield a retirement account larger
than the actual amount invested adjusted for inflation, so as
to reward saving. There are many investment opportunities
that provide a reasonable rate of return. In engineering re-
tirement security for America's future generation, lawmakers
must make sure to give workers the opportunity to earn as
much as they can on their investment. 87
Other commentators offer similar critiques of Social Security's low
rate of return, contrasting it with returns offered by the stock market,
admittedly at a higher risk.88
There are a number of standard ripostes generally offered by
supporters of social insurance in answer to the rate of return and
adequacy-equity arguments. First, calculating the "rate of return" itself
can be problematic, and there is no universally accepted method. 89 It
is particularly difficult to take into account the certainty of receiving
the annuity as a calculable factor. Of course, private accounts invested
in stock mutual funds are subject to the risk of losing equity as a result
" See, e.g., Burke &Couch, supra note 33, at 1167-73.
87
 Nickles, supra note 34, at 90. Senator Nickles goes on to contrast the savings possi-
bilities with Social Security's poor investment possibilities:
The benefit of long-term savings and investment is compounded interest. Re-
searchers have analyzed both historical data and projections for the future
with results that are staggering in terms of the rate of return of Social Security
versus private markets.... Social Security's real rates of return are diminish 7
ing rapidly. The average worker retiring in 1997 will recover the value of her
own and her employer's contributions in 13.9 years; however, it will take al-
most twice as long for the average worker retiring in 2025 to recover those
contributions-26.2 years.
Id. at 96-97.
88
 Solomon and Barrow summarize the issue this way: "Under either pay-as-you-go or
partial advance financing, Social Security is unable to provide an adequate pension system.
This is primarily due to the fact that without full financing, the system cannot exploit the
tax-free compounding of interest on funds paid into the system." Solomon & Barrow, supra
note 7, at 15.
" See limg-Ping Chen & Stephen C. Goss, Are Returns on Payroll Taxes Fair?, in SOCIAL
SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 67, at 76-89; see alsoJohn Geanakoplos et al.,
a Nivalized Social Security System Really Pay a Higher Rate of Return?, in FRAMING THE
SOCIAL SECURITY DEBATE, supra note 7, at 137.
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of the vagaries of the stock market. But even private annuities pur-
chased from an insurance company are not necessarily completely
secure; insurance companies can always go bankrupt or otherwise be-
come unable to honor their obligations under annuity policies. There
is always a risk, therefore, that an annuity policy might not provide
income until death. In contrast, social insurance payments underwrit-
ten by the taxation power of the federal government run no risk of
being unfunded as a result of financial difficulties.
The rate of return calculation depends a great deal on the eco-
nomic and cost assumptions used to set parameters such as the rate of
inflation over the worker's lifetime, the value attached to cost of living
increases in benefits after retirement, the value of survivors, disability,
dependents benefits that might or might not be paid, and the steadi-
ness of the worker's earnings history. 99 As a result, different analysts
produce different estimates of the actual cost-benefit ratio." It is clear
that current and future generations of workers will not receive the
"bonanza" returns that the first two or three generations of retirees
received, since the later generations will have been paying taxes into
the system at higher rates over most of their working careers. 92 None-
theless, most workers should receive at least a small positive return
when comparing their benefits to the taxes they paid.°
Focusing on the calculation of returns, however, begs the more
fundamental questions—why has the debate centered on the com-
parison between taxes paid and benefits received? And what assump-
tions about Social Security have produced this tax-benefit comparison
in the first place? One reason, of course, is Franklin Roosevelt's insis-
tence on tying worker contributions to benefits as a matter of political
support for the new program.94 History aside, the financing mecha-
nism of the program also invites such a comparison. But even though
benefits have always been financed primarily by payroll tax revenues,
it does not follow that benefits need have any direct relationship to
payroll taxes paid by individual workers, any more than the benefit of
defense spending has any direct relationship to income taxes paid. It
apparently seems intuitively correct to view the "value" of Social Secu-
rity as a matter of comparison of "what you get" with "what you paid,"
90 See Chen & Goss, supra note 89, at 76-89,
51
 See id,
92
 See id, at 83.
93 See id. at 88.
91 See infix notes 231-232 and accompanying text.
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yet it is difficult to think of any other tax-supported program for
which such comparisons are routinely made.
One probable reason the individual cost-benefit standard is ap-
plied to Social Security but not, for example, to national defense is
that provision for retirement appears, on the surface, to be a function
that can be undertaken through private means, without government
involvement. As a result, as has been the case for many government
functions that have been privatized over the past decade—prison op-
eration or the postal service—the advantages of the private alternative
are generally more of a focus than the internal problems of the gov-
ernment program being privatized." In general, the case for a private
account system rests on the notion that equity and property-based in-
come rights are seen as the best—or the only---source of retirement
income security.
The focus on comparing payments made to beneficiaries with the
taxes they paid into the system, while intuitively appealing, nonethe-
less is misguided. There is no compelling reason why the financing
mechanism should determine the perceived value of the benefits
paid. Payroll taxes are merely a method of financing the system, not
the basis for benefits earned and paid out. 96 Benefit calculations are
made based on earnings recorded in the Social Security system, which
is done as a record-keeping matter through withholding tax records
filed with the Federal Reserve and forwarded to the Social Security
Administration. 97 But benefit calculations do not take into account
the amount of taxes paid; and benefits cannot be reduced in the event
of a failure to pay such taxes by the employer who is responsible for
withholding FICA taxes from workers' paychecks." The system could
as easily be financed through income tax revenues, like other gov-
ernment expenditures, without any impact on the earnings-based
benefit structure.
Yet the tax-benefit comparison is routinely and unquestioningly
raised as a disadvantage of Social Security, and 'proponents of Social
Security expend almost as much effort in attempting to prove more
95 See liathryn L. Moore, Privatization of Social Security: Misguided Reform, 71 TEMP. L.
REV. 131, 132 (1998).
96 The Social Security Act entitles all who meet the eligibility criteria to benefits based
on earnings recorded through the payroll tax withholding system. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 402,
413-415 (1994).
97 Id.
98 I.R.C. §§ 3101-3328 (1994).
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favorable rates of return as a counter-argument. 99 This analysis may be
properly applied to a private annuity or insurance policy, but it is al-
most completely irrelevant to a direct transfer program under which
the worker will receive benefits based on her earnings record regard-
less of the amount of taxes actually paid into the system. Nonetheless,
the power of the idea of equity-based economic rights is such that
both critics and supporters of Social Security have difficulty apprais-
ing the program's value without transforming taxes of general appli-
cation into individual equity investments, and then mistakenly apply-
ing a straightforward investment/return ratio analysis to a benefit
structure that is specifically designed to limit benefits for the highly-
paid (thus depressing their "rate of return") and to provide dispro2
portionately higher benefits for the low-paid.m°
This weighted benefit formula is itself a target for those criticiz-
ing Social Security as a bad "investment" for individual workers.tot
The system is charged with economic inefficiency because it attempts
to combine, in these critics' view, social welfare with economic equity
functions and as a result fails at both, 142 This view of Social Security as
combining "adequacy" (just-above-poverty-level benefits for low-
income elderly workers) with "equity" (benefits that increase as earn-
ings increase, and that are paid regardless of income level in retire-
ment) has long troubled conservative and liberal critics alike as an
inefficient use of scarce public resources.ws
Both groups tend to view economic efficiency in the targeting of
benefits as a paramount social policy goal that Social Security fails to
achieve, as many workers with consistent lifetime earnings above the
wage base, or with inherited or other unearned wealth, have more
than adequate resources to support a comfortable retirement without
any assistance from Social Security. 104 This perceived defect results in
calls for means-testing Social Security, both from liberals and conser-
99 See, e.g., Chen & Goss, supra note 89, at 76-89; see also •itnovouE MARMOR El' AL.,
AMERICA'S MISUNDERSTOOD WELFARE STATE: PERSISTENT MYTHS, ENDURING REALITIES
163-64 (1992) (contending that charge that Social Security is a Total scheme" is mud-
slinging, Lunt mischaracterizes public satisfaction with the system).
10° See TRUSTEES' REPORT, supra note 41, at 68-69.
101 See, e.g., Nickles, supra note 34, at 90; Solomon & Barrow, supra note 7, at 15.
102 See Solomon & Barrow, supra note 7, at 14.
103 See id,
11f1 See id.
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vatives, as a way to insure that government benefits do not go to rela-
tively wealthy retirees who do not need them."
Such calls for means-testing of course ignore the theory of Social
Security as an earned entitlement that is quite different from charity
or welfare." This latter perspective is actually the view most Ameri-
cans have traditionally held about Social Security, and it is a view en-
couraged by the perception of FICA taxes as the payment for their
benefits similar to private annuity purchase. 1 °7 The focus on equity
and on the purchase of or investment in benefits as the source of fu-
ture retirement income has probably helped to create broad public
support for the program. The unfortunate result is that support for
Social Security is based at least in part on a misapprehension about
social insurance, one that also has given rise to the rate of return fal-
lacy and debate. The fact that the most accurate description of the
Social Security entitlement is "earned," not "paid for," has generally
escaped public attention and is an oversight that has been encour-
aged by various political leaders. The question should be reexamined,
however, as attention to earnings rather than contributions as the ba-
sis for entitlement rights produces a more lasting and sound ap-
proach to the retirement income issue.
The flip side of the public's support for their "annuities" is the
perception that the public has been simply fooled into thinking they
have an earned right entitlement and that social insurance benefits,
like. all other government payments, should be directed by policy
planners and politicians to those groups who need them the most."
This policy analysis is the latter-day equivalent of prescriptions for
outdoor poor relief that succeeded the English Poor Law. Poor relief,
105 For a discussion of suggestions for means-testing, see Eric R. Kingsou & James H.
Schulz, Should Social Security Be Means-Tested', in SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY,
supra note 67, at 41-61.
E°6
 See infra notes 270-278 and accompanying text for a discussion on public accep-
tan ce of earnings-based benefits as opposed to needs-based benefits. This attitude also
reflects the social welfare policy analyst's reluctance to accept needs-based welfare benefits
as the stigmatized, lesser-status benefits as compared to Social Security benefits, which have
always had middle-class acceptance with little or no stigma because of the earned right on
which they are based.
1 °7
 See Virginia P. Reno & Robert B. Friedland, Strong Support but Low Confidence: What
Explains the Contradiction?, in SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 67, at
178-94.
I°8 See, e.g., Mickey Kaus, The Case for Means-Testing Social Security, in SOCIAL WELFARE
POLICY AT THE CROSSROADS: RETHINKING THE ROLES OF SOCIAL INSURANCE, TAX EXPEN-
DITURES, MANDATES, AND MEANS TESTING 117-24 (Robert B. Friedland et al. eds., 1999)
(proposing transformation of Social Security into an Australian-style means-tested pension
eliminating benefits for those with high income or assets).
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both in Europe and in the United States, has formed the core of the
Western approach to poverty which is based on a hierarchical view of
wealth, poverty and moral worth." Poor relief, like the charity of
Aesop's ant, allows the well-off to determine who among the poor is
worthy of support and acknowledges no right or entitlement belong-
ing to the poor based on any factor—citizenship, past work effort,
etc.—other than need. The Social Security entitlement, based on a
lifetime of work, is fundamentally the antithesis of the poor relief
model.
In summary, the argument that Social Security does not provide a
high enough rate of return on the tax "investment" of individual
workers relies on the notion that payroll taxes are equivalent to equity
investments. Thus, the success of the argument depends on recharac-
terizing Social Security as a type of private annuity, something the
program does not much resemble, and then criticizing it for failing to
provide "investment returns" that were never a goal of the program in
the first place. Whatever the actual merits of the rate of return argu-
ment, what is most interesting is its assumption that an equity interest
is necessary to insure future income in old age. As will he discussed
below, it is this core assumption that is most in doubt.
3. Social SeCurity Costs Too,Much
The third major criticism of social insurance as a mode of secur-
ing retirement income is focused on the overall cost of Social Security,
both in terms of public finance (as a question of the cost of the pro-
gram as a percentage of government resources or of GNP) and in
terms of the future financial problems of the program (as benefits
begin to outstrip payroll tax revenues).110 The popular version of this
concern is "Will Social Security be there when I retire?" an almost
theological approach to the public policy question of how best to pro-
vide for elderly Americans and continue to allow retirement in the
absence of physical or mental incapacity for work. 111
There are several common elements in the various critiques relat-
ing to the fiscal burden of ,public retirement programs. First, critics
repeatedly cite the dangers of "pay-as-you-go" financing, which results
100 For a thorough discussion of the roots of American attitudes toward the poor as
well as of current welfare policy, see generallyiom, HANDLER, THE POVERTY OF WELFARE
REFORM (1995).
110 TRUSTEES' REPORT, Supra note 41, at 19-31.
in See Solomon & Barrow, supra note 7, at 13 11.78 ("Today more young Americans be-
lieve in UFOs than believe they will receive their Social Security benefits.").
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in benefit obligations being incurred without being funded in ad-
vance, as would be required for a private pension program." 2 A vari-
ety of ills arise from this financing structure according to these critics,
including: the unfunded liabilities of future retirement benefits; re-
curring financial crises as revenues are outstripped by benefit pay-
ments; and a false sense of security foisted on the public when sur-
pluses are run since those payroll tax surpluses are merely covering
income tax deficits.'"
Policy analysts frequently approach this issue by comparing the
financing of Social Security with the financing required under federal
law and accounting standards for private pension plans, raising the
specter of "unfunded liabilities" of the system and charging the cur-
rent structure with financial instability.'" In a similar vein, critics fre-
quently characterize the continued expansion of the Social Security
program, without corresponding tax increases sufficient to fund those
expansions in advance, as evidence of "fiscal instability." 115 For these
critics, the only answer to this instability would be full advance fund-
ing of retirement benefits, on either a public or an individual basis.'"
Second, many privatization advocates blame Social Security's per-
ceived financial problems on what they see as unwarranted legislative
expansion of Social Security from what was (again in their view) a lim-
ited anti-poverty program for the elderly at its inception in the
1930s." 7 Many of the "cost" critiques reveal, in both their rhetoric and
substance, an acute discomfort with the major role of government in
determining individual retirement income planning that has resulted
from the breadth and ' extent of Social Security benefits and cover-
age.'I 8
112 See id. at 14.
113 See Ball, supra note 68, at 127-28.
"4 Solomon and Barrow note that:
Social Security ... enjoys the dubious honor of being the largest single item
in the federal budget and the largest government program in American his-
tory. Social Security outlay's currently represent more than one-fourth of non-
defense expenditures, and future obligations are projected to quickly con-
sume assets, bankrupting the system, under the Social Security Board's in-
termediate assumptions, by 2030.
Solomon & Barrow, supra note 7, at 13 (citations omitted).
116 See id. at 14 ("The stability of pay-as-you-go financing depends upon the business cy-
cle, fertility rates. inflation, and demographics.").
" 6 See id.
" 7 See Nickles, supra note 34, at 81.
"6 Id.
September 2000]	 Social Secupity Privatization	 1005
These criticisms are based on a consistent philosophical view that
the appropriate role of government in the economic affairs of indi-
viduals is a very limited one, resulting in minimal interference with
the operation Of the market economy. However, concerns about the
over-expansion of Social Security and its intrusiveness in regulating
private economic matters, while of major importance to policy mak-
ers, are not based on essential structural problems of the retirement
system, but rather, are political critiques arising from political and
philosophical differences of opinion about the role of government
generally. Thus, there can be no "right" answer to the charge of "too
big" a program, but only opinion informed by underlying political
philosophies about the federal government's responsibility, its intru-
sion into individual citizens' lives, and the like.
The specific application of this vision to Social Security, however,
has a couple of interesting twists that are tied to these advocates' at-
tachment to equity ownership and private property rights as the
source of autonomy and individual freedom.n 9 In particular, criti-
cisms of the expansion of Social Security to provide both higher levels
and more types of benefits are rooted in opposition to a permanent
earnings-based entitlement that is not subject to periodic re-
evaluation of eligibility based on poverty. 129 Those who advocate pri-
vatizing Social Security appear t6 see entitlement programs as wrest-
ing control over who receives government largesse away from Con-
gress and the political forces influencing legislation, thus diminishing
the role of public needs-based welfare programs which traditionally
have been far more controlling of the lives of recipients and far less
generous in the amounts paid than social insurance programs have
been. 121
In addition, the critiques of pay-as-you-go financing and the pre-
dictions of financial crisis arising from Social Security's "unfunded
liabilities" inevitably are accompanied by calls for advance funding of
Social Security (and failing that, for a private system that in effect re-
quires individuals to advance fund their own retirement) . 122 Advance
119 See id. at 98-99 (observing that personal retirement accounts would give individuals
ownership and property rights over their retirement savings).
120 See Solomon & Barrow, supra note 7, at 14; see also Sheppard supra note 51, at 1012.
121 See generally HANDLER, supra note 109; S010111011 & Barrow, supra note 7.
122 See Solomon & Barrow, supra note 7, at 15-16 (discussing proposals to fix Social Se-
curity); see also Peter A. Diamond, The Economics of Social &coat Refiron, in FRAMING THE
SOCIAL. SEcultrry DEnATE, supra note 7, at 60-61 ("A larger (rust fund is a way of making
Social Security more valuable for future generations at a cost of making it less valuable for
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funding of Social Security seems to be the public equivalent of equity-
based annuities in the private sector. In essence, these critics would
require the public entitlement based on past earnings to be tied to a
corresponding public capital account, a true equivalent to the private
pension fund, from which all benefits, current and future, would be
financed based on a private equity interest. 123 Once again, privatiza-
tion arguments, and even moderate prefunding suggestions, that
generally appear to be based on economic rationalism and numerical
data seem, upon closer examination, to be based just as much on a
philosophical devotion to the property right principle.
The overarching complaint that "Social Security costs too much"
can be addressed on several different levels. First, in answer to the
question of how large a percentage of the federal budget should be
devoted to Social Security .benefits, the correct percentage is for the
most part a matter of political opinion. Those advocating an expan-
sive federal government are not necessarily alarmed by as much as
25-30% of the budget being absorbed by Social Security expendi-
tures, particularly in the post-Cold War era. 124 Indeed, it could be ar-
gued that devoting government spending to transfer payments which
are either spent on goods and services purchased by beneficiaries or
. saved and invested, have more salutary economic effects than spend-
ing on military hardware or other government capital expenditures
which may have fewer reverberating economic benefits. Thus, the in-
creases in expenditures necessary to pay for the retirement of the
baby boomers over the next 40 years may be problematic only if one
thinks that the government should not be large to start with, or that
there are better ways to spend those funds.
Second, concerns about the absolute level to which payroll taxes
would have to rise to support future benefits are based on the assump-
tion that all future benefits should be financed by the payroll tax.
HoWever, even the original design of SoCial Security did not entail
sole reliance on the payroll tax as a financing mechanism, 125
 and it is
certainly possible that other sources of revenue within the purview of
the federal tax power could be utilized to finance benefits in the fu-
current generation.... The greater the degree of funding, the more the concern will be
reduced.").
125 See Diamond, supra note 122, at 60-61.
124
 See Ball, supra note 68, at 128.
125 Seel DOUGLAS BROWN, ESSAYS ON SOCIAL SECURITY 44-56 (1977). Brown was the
chair of the 1937-1938 Advisory Council on Social Security which developed touch of the
1939 Act.
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ture. Moreover, even if the payroll tax does remain the exclusive
financing source, there is no agreement among economists, actuaries,
or other experts on how high the tax rate will eventually have to be to
cover benefit outlays, or on what effect such increases may have on
the national economy. 126 Assertions that as much as 25% of payroll (in
contrast to the current 12.4%) will be required to cover OASDI
benefit obligations in the future are no more authoritative than
claims that the payroll tax will not have to rise at all, especially if the
age of retirement continues to rise. 127 Of course, objections to theo-
retical payroll tax increases can also be raised against increases in in-
come taxes that might be necessary should the financing mechanism
change. The principle underlying this critique, then, is really the
same opposition to income redistribution through the tax and benefit
structure that has surfaced in connection with the other critiques of
Social Security.
Third, critics of the expansion of Social Security to cover ancil-
lary benefit categories and to increase benefits in step with the con-
sumer price index ("CPI") appear to a great extent to be simply ex-
pressing their own opposition to an expansive federal government
role in income maintenance. One problem with such criticism of the
"expansion" of Social Security to its current scope and size is that it is
based on faulty history. 128 Social Security was envisioned from the be-
ginning as eventually leading to the abolition of needs-based poverty
programs for all but the extremely unfortunate, on the assumption
that all adult breadwinners would be part of the covered work force
and thus would earn a retirement benefit by the time they reached
old age. 129 The program was meant to prevent those who had always
worked in the paid labor force (and their dependents) from having to
126 StY, e.g., LAWRENCE IL THOMPSON, ADMINISTERING INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS IN SO-
CAM. SECURITY: DIE ROLE OF VALUES AND OBJECTIVES IN SHAPING OPTIONS 5 (1999) (dis-
cussing generally the desire to avoid any additional burden on employers). See also Titus-
TEES' REPORT, supra note 41, at 22-30.
127 TRUSTEES' REPORT, supra note 41, at 173; see also Solomon & Barrow, supra note 7,
at 13,
126
 Nickles, supra note 34, at 98. The claim made by Nickles that Social Security was
supposed to be self sustaining is not correct. It was known from the beginning that payroll
tax financing would just be a beginning to the solution and ii was not expected to last
indefinitely. See. A Letter from the President's Committee on Economic Secttrit Accompanying the
Foregoing Message, January 17, 1935, in THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT 47 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1938); see also The White House Statement Summariz-
ing Report from the President's Committee on Economic Security (Exempts), January 17, 1935, in
TILE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN 0. ROOSEVELT, supra; at 49, 53.
129 SeeliRourN, supra note 125, at 6, 26, 84-85.
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demonstrate need in order to qualify for a benefit upon reaching old
age.is°
The "unfunded liabilities" critique of pay-as-you-go financing
seems on the surface to be based on objective, nonpolitical criteria of
actuarial and insurance principles. Application of private annuity cri-
teria to a public transfer program, however, is neither necessary nor
appropriate. If Social Security is viewed as a claim on income that is
not based on equity but on an earned right to income at the time it is
needed to pay for consumption in old age, then pay-as-you-go
financing can be seen as an integral element of the structure and a
sensible means of providing funding at the time benefits must be paid
out. In any event, the concept of "unfunded liabilities" is incongruous
in the context of a publicly financed program supported by the gov-
ernment's power to tax; bankruptcy is an odd analogy to use in con-
nection with a publicly financed program that cannot in fact go bank-
rupt in fiscal terms.
Finally, the "high cost" of financing the baby boom's retirement is
generally seen as a problem only of the publicly financed retirement
program. Private solutions such as mutual funds, insurance annuity
policies, employer-provided pensions and the like are marketed vig-
orously as a source of wealth and opportunity for those with the ability
to take advantage of them. On a demographic basis, however, the
overall share of the nation's GNP devoted to providing necessary
goods and services to retired baby boomers will increase to the same
level whether the source of funding is public or private. The real issue
raised by the demographic patterns of aging already in place for this
century is how the resources available to purchase those goods and
services will be distributed among the elderly at each income level.
There is a substantial likelihood that a private account system would
result in longer working lives for many older Americans, as the risk of
arriving at retirement age with insufficient resources to support re-
tirement will inevitably be higher for lower wage workers in such a
system.
4. Depression of Savings Rate
Martin Feldstein has argued for the past thirty years that the exis-
tence of Social Security has a detrimental effect on the national sav-
ings rate and that the current pay-as-you-go financing structure both
I 3° See id. at 71.
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discourages individuals from saving for their own retirement and in-
hibits national accumulation of capital and economic growth."
Solomon and Barrow further argue that in the absence of either pri-
vate retirement accounts or a pre-funded public system "an
intergenerational transfer occurs from the working young to the re-
tired elderly. " 132
There has been substantial controversy over Feldstein's original
work both because of a technical flaw in Feldstein's calculations 133 as
well as a lack of consensus over the general theory of the connection
between Social Security and the national savings rate. Feldstein re-
calibrated his calculations and—based on time-series data attempting
to connect "social security wealth" (a concept Feldstein defines as the
actuarial present value of Social Security benefits for the current adult
population when they reach age sixty-five minus the payroll taxes they
will have paid by that age) to aggregate private savings and consump-
don—continues to claim that Social Security must depress the na-
tional savings rate. 134 Feldstein has been unstinting in advocating
elimination of Social Security, a latter-day Cato the Elder declaring
"Social Security delencla est." 133
In his later work, Feldstein has emphasized not just the effect of
Social Security on individual savings but also the effects of an "un-
funded" pay-as-you-go system on overall levels of capital accumulation
as the cumulative effect of depressed individual savings reduces the
aggregate capital supply. 136 He concludes that "existing social security
131 See Feldstein, Social Security, supra note 31.
132 Solomon & Barrow, supra note 7, at 16.
133 SELIG D. LESNOV & D.R. LEIMER, SOCIAL SECURITY AND PRIVATE SAVING: NEW TIME
SERIES EVIDENCE wreti AUI'ERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS (Social Security Admin. Office of'
Research & Stat. Working Paper No. 22, 1981).
134 Martin S. Feldstein, Social Security and Private Saving: Reply, 90 J. Put.. ECON. 630,
630-42 (1982).
133 Cato the Elder was noted for his unwavering hatred of the stale of Carthage, and
for his declaration each time he took the floor of the Roman Senate, "Carthago delenda
est1"—"Carthage must be destroyed." For Feldstein's similarly unwayering opposition to
Social Security, see Martin S. Feldstein, Should Social Security Be Means-Tested?, 95 J. POL.
ECON. 468-84 (1987); Martin S. Feldstein, Toward a Worm of Social Security, 40 Tut: Punt.tc
INTEREST (1975); and see generally MARTIN FELDSTEIN, WOULD PRIVATIZING SOCIAL. SE-
CURITY RAISE ECONOMIC WELFARE? (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper
5281,1995).
136 Feldstein states that:
The social security payroll tax distorts the supply of labor and the form of
compensation.... Unlike private pensions and individual retirement ac-
counts, the social security system dues not invest the money that it collects in
stocks and bonds but pays those funds out as benefits in the same year that
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wealth reduces overall private saving by nearly 60 percent," as it
"causes each generation to reduce its savings substantially and thereby
to incur a substantial loss of real investment income."'"
The technical accuracy of Feldstein's economic analysis aside,
what is striking from the perspective of developing a theoretical basis
for retirement income security is the importance to his argument of
the property metaphor and the economic necessity of capital accumu-
lation. Feldstein's economic analysis, as well as his political critique,
relies on the assumption that individual well-being in old age is de-
pendent on the level of wealth accumulation (public and private)
prior to retirement. The concept of "social security wealth" itself seeks
to express future access to continued consumption in retirement as
the present value of the future income stream, transforming that con-
tinued access into a current dollar figure representing accumulated
wealth. Thus, the entire. debate, in Feldstein's terms, is about how to
accumulate the highest pile of figurative grains of wheat with which to
survive old age.
Despite Feldstein's "rehabilitation" of his original calculations
concerning the link between Social Security and private savings, many
economists dispute his conclusions about the relationship between
personal savings and economic growth, as well as his underlying as-
smnptions about the effect of Social Security on the savings rate. For
example, Robert Barro argued in 1978 that the existence of Social
Security has affected the transfer of accumulated wealth from the
older to the younger generation in a way that offsets the possible dis-
savings effects of Social Security.' 38
 A number of economists including
Alicia Munnell and Henry Aaron and, more recently, a survey of the
literature by the Congressional Budget Office have found no conclu-
sive evidence that the drop in the U.S. savings rate is a result of the
existence of Social Security rather than other economic and social
factors. 139
they are collected. The rate of return dim individuals earn on their manda-
tory social security contributions is therefore far less than they could earn in a
private pension or in a funded social security program....
FELDSTEIN, REFORM, supra note 7, at 5-6.
' 37 Id. at 17-18.
' 38 See generally ROBERT J. BARRO, THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL SECURITY ON PRIVATE SAV-
INGS-EVIDENCE FROM THE U.S. TIME SERIES (1 978).
139
 See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, ASSESSING
THE DECLINE IN THE NATIONAL SAVINGS RATE 37 (1993); MUNNELL, supra note 66, at 77-
88; HENRY AARON, ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF SOCIAL SECURITY 51-52 (1982); see also Olivia S.
Mitchell & Stephen P. Zeldes, Social Senility Privatization: A Structure for Analysis, 86 Am.
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Moreover, the connection between personal savings and national
(or international) capital formation and economic growth and well-
being is far from established. 140 Economist Arthur Okun argued in
1975—at the same time Feldstein did his original work on Social Se-
curity and savings+that there is little evidence that the level of savings
in the United States is in any way insufficient to support economic
growth and investment: "[T]he specter of depressed saving is not only
empirically implausible but logically fake. . . . The nation can have the
level of saving and investment it wants with more or less income redis-
tribution, so long as it is willing to twist some other dials. "141 Indeed,
given the substantial increase in Stock market investments by pension
plans, the current U.S. savings rate and its relationship to overall eco-
nomic growth is difficult to estimate. 142
Clearly, then, there is no consensus among economists and actu-
aries in support of either the technical validity of Feldstein's savings
rate argument or the conclusions about economic growth he: draws
from his data. The continued reliance of privatization advocates such
as Solomon and Barrow on the savings rate depression argument
therefore reveals a great deal abOut the underlying philosophical and
political . assumptions of the privatization argument, which is built
Upon a vision of economic' rights founded solely and exclusively on
private property rights. 143
ECON. ftrv. 363, 366 (1996) ("Overall, it seems precarious to build a case for privatization
based on the argument that it would increase national savings.").
140 According to economist James Schulz:
It is a common misconception that there is a direct relationship between the
personal saving of individuals (for 'retirement and other reasons) and eco-
nomic growth. While there is a need for saving to facilitate investment in the
economy, there is a variety of ways such saving can be accumulated. !knee,
there is no agreement on the need' or importance of any one accumulation
process, such as through personal saving or private pensions.
Schulz, supia note 73, at 112.
141 Id. at 113 (citation omitted).
142 See Kathy Bergen, Personal Savings Stutter Mile the Economy Hems, Cm. Thin., June 5,
1998, at N1 ("'Americans are actually doing pretty well' in their savings, according to Dal-
las Salisbury, president of the Employee Bcnefit Research Institute. The household savings
rate is somewhat misleading, he said, noting, for example, that it 'doesn't include any Val-
ues going up in the eqUity markets and it doesn't include a hit of money in defined-benelit
(traditional) pension plans, and that adds up to substantial amounts of individual
wealth.'").
143 See Soknuon Barrow, supra note 7, at 17; see also infra notes 147-173 and accom-
panying text.
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In the absence of compelling evidence that private capital .accu-
mulation in the form of private savings is a necessary precondition for
adequate economic growth, this critique of Social Security must be
based on a philosophical and political preference for individually
controlled savings and investment as what is viewed as the fulfillment
of the ideological imperatives of the free market economic system.
Indeed, even if Feldstein's analysis were correct—even if Social Secu-
rity does depress the national savings rate—the argument against So-
cial Security as a retirement income support system would remain essen-
tially philosophical and ideological in character, since it is grounded
in the equity .accumulation model. The savings _rate critique of Social
Security is not about adequate retirement income but rather about•in-
creased capital accumulation and investment. Privatization advocates
appear to assume that those two goals are synonymous—but that as-
sumption can only be accepted if one assumes that economic rights in
old age cannot be secured by any other means.
In summary, it appears that the real differences between publicly
financed retirement programs and privately controlled investment
funds preserved for retirement are the ancillary consequences of the
status of the latter as private equity. Equity can be individually con-
trolled, used as a source of capital accumulation for the economy
generally, inherited by the next generation, and, perhaps most impor-
tantly, distributed among Members of the working and non-working
population through the Mechanics of the market and the good or .bad
fortune of each individual. Social Security, on the other hand, as a
public entitlement program, is controlled by the public as a whole
through elected representatives, directly recycles tax revenues col-
lected by the federal government out to beneficiaries for immediate
spending, provides no opportunity for inheritance by heirs, and, most
importantly, redistributes income according to public policy deci-
sions. The major complaints about Social Security from those who
would take the public's retirement rights private center on the ways in
which Social Security is most unlike private equity. Yet it was private
equity that failed to prevent widespread old age poverty in the face of
economic depression in the 1930s—a failure that led to the estab-
lishment of the program in the first place. 144
"4 See infra notes 210-220 and accompanying text.
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B. The Case For Privatization—"To Get Rich is Glorious"
Proposals to substitute private savings plans for the public enti-
tlement did not begin to gain much popular attention or support un-
til the early 1980s, during the well-publicized series of financing crises
and subsequent congressional actions on Social Security. 145 However,
it was not until the long bull market that began in roughly 1982 was
well established, in the midst of the longest peacetime economic ex-
pansion in American history, 14° that calls for privatization reached be-
yond the confines of policy salons and congressional hearing
rooms, 147
Most advocates for a system of private accounts focus on the op-
portunities for individuals to increase their prospective retirement
income through private investment, in contrast to the limited return
on the taxes they pay to support the Social Security system. 148 This
"opportunity cost" analysis, which .compares taxes paid in to benefits
paid out, is based on the faulty "rate of return" analysis discussed pre-
viously. 149 But the campaign for private accounts reveals more, in both
the substance and the rhetoric of the arguments used, about the roots
of opposition to socialized responsibility for income maintenance
based on entitlement rather than on individual determinations of
need.
Both those who support Social Security and those who would
take it private seek to promote individual autonomy. For supporters,
Social Security's status as an earned entitlement gives beneficiaries
autonomy in old age by guaranteeing a source of income that will pre-
vent poverty upon retirement. 150 Advocates of privatization, on the
145 See MARMOR ET AL., 314/01/ Hole 99, at 128-32 (discussing of Social Security financing
"crisis" of early 1080's and public reaction).
146 See, e.g., Louis Rukeyser, Small Firms Look Like '87 Winners, CIIL 'NIB., Jan. 17, 1087,
at CO (slating the bull market began in August of 1082).
147 While Feldstein can be said to have begun the chorus of calls for privatization of
Social Security with his economics papers from the 1970s forward, the real flood of argu-
ment for privatization began with proponents like Ferrara in 1980 and continuing with
Peterson's popularizing work in die late 1980s. The prolonged bull market began in about
1982, as discussed in ROBERT SMILER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 5(2000).
19
	 cu/na notes 80-109 and accompanying text. 	 '
149 See supra notes 80-109 and accompanying text.
E.J. Dionne puts it this way:
Social insurance was a wise admission on the part. of supporters of competi-
tive economies that citizens would take the risk such economies require only
if they were provided with a degree of security, especially against old age... ,
Risk is tolerable, even desirable, as long as every one of life's risks does not
become an all or nothing game.... The power of the social insurance idea
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other hand, with their faith in the dynamism of the free market, focus
on individual autonomy before retirement, viewing individual invest-
ment accounts in terms of opportunity rather than risk and consign-
ing those whose gambles fail to pay off to poverty and the care of pub-
lic charity.lm In the words of the New China Motto, "To get rich is
glorious."152
 An account system based on risking equity promises the
chance of substantial wealth in old age, not merely the security pro-
vided by a right limited to a defined future income stream under So-
cial Security.
The substantive arguments made by private account advocates
and the rhetoric they employ embody a latter-day Protestant ethic that
is at once optimistic and ruthless. The arguments can generally be
grouped into three categories. First, supporters argue that an individ-
ual account system would provide a vastly improved rate of return
from investment in equities, or even from straight interest compound-
ing, for all or almost all participants.'" The implicit—and occasionally
explicit—promise is that retirement savings in such a system could
provide an opportunity to live better in retirement than while work-
ing. Second, each individual would be able to take control of her own
retirement planning and tailor savings and investment plans to indi-
vidual needs and visions of retirement; in the new retirement system,
everyone will be his or her own money. manager. 154 Third, private ac-
counts would reverse the downward trend in the national savings rate
and provide a source of capital building for the economy as a whole,
leading to increased economic growth and presumably more retire-
ment resources for al1. 155
Possibly the most important conclusion that can be drawn from
looking at these arguments as a whole is that the private account sys-
tem has a fundamentally different purpose, as well as a different
ethos, from that of Social Security. All of the advantages claimed by
the private account system over the public system derive from individ-
rests on a respect for individualism. It does not rest on a utopian and mis-
taken view of what radical individualism can accomplish.
1.11.J. Dionne Jr., Social Security Thief No. 6, Why Social Insurance? (visited Sept. 12, 2000)
<littp//ww%vmasi.org/socsec/briefs/ssbr6.1ttr>.
151 Burke & McGottch, supra note 33, at 1167-73.
152 
..,r‘:"egnizerally ORVILLE SCHELL, TO GET RICH IS GLORIOUS, CH/NA IN THE EIGHTIES
(1084).
153 See, e.g., Republican Party, Blueprint, supra note 55.
151 See id.
155 Feldstein's work is largely devoted to this notion, as discussed supra notes 131-144
and accompanying text.
September 20001	 Social Security Privatization	 1015
ual risk, trading the surety of at least moderate income that has un-
derwritten the modern institution of retirement for the possibility of
greater wealth in retirement (and in inheritance). Adequate retire-
ment income is assumed as a necessary byproduct of the superior
capital accumulation of the private account system, and the risk of not
having sufficient equity to last until death is deemed worth taking for
the sake of greater potential returns. 156
The case for privatization is subject to a variety of counterargu-
ments which demonstrate that, once again, there is no conclusive
economic or demographic argument which can in any sense "objec-
tively" close the debate for one side or the other. Because the real ar-
guments are political and philosophical, and because the goals of the
two sides are similar, the real questions are much more difficult. Both
privatizers and supporters of social welfare programs appear to be-
lieve in the importance of being entitled. The difference is how the
entitlement is created—publicly or privately.
There are several points to be made in connection with private
accounts before moving on to the problems with property-based enti-
tlements from the perspective of social welfare advocates. First, the
case for private accounts assumes that increased individual capital ac-
cumulation will lead to increased investment capital on a national ba-
sis and that the latter is necessary for increased economic growth.
This is a rather simplistic view of the relationship between individual
savings and capital accumulation necessary for national economic in-
vestment and growth. Moreover, , little if any evidence is presented in
any of the privatization literature indicating a national or global capi-
tal shortage which private accounts would be necessary to remedy.
Second, the "property right" of the private account is presented as a
principal advantage of privatization. Some advocates are quite explicit
about the advantages of such a property right in terms of estate build-
156 Solomon and Barrow argue that:
Social Security must be liberated from its inherently contradictory welfitre
and insurance roles and its finulainentally unstable financing scheme. The
current system inns( be replaced with a program that grants workers a stake in
their retirenteld, eliminates the negative impact on personal savings, and al-
lows retirees (0 enjoy the benefits they have earned. Privatization is necessary
In achieve these goals, to break the political quagmire, and to provide ibr the
futures of tomorrow's retirees. PriYalized pensions offer superior returns,
carry protected property rights, ancl are beyond the reach of politicians.
Solomon & Barrow, supra note 7, at 17.
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ing.I57
 While advocates focus on the inheritance advantages of private
accounts for low-wage workerS, presumably these advantages would be
even greater for higher-wage workers who would be less likely than
low-wage workers to exhaust accumulated accounts in retirement.
Yet a system of private accounts was essentially in place as what
passed for a national retirement system before the enactment of So-
cial Security. 158
 While most women were not in the paid work force,
and most men worked long past age 65, those who did retire had to
rely on private resources, at least once the generation entitled to Civil
War veterans' benefits had died out. 159
 One question to ask, therefore,
is whether conditions today are, or the proposed private account sys-
tem itself is, so different from the purely private voluntary savings and
rudimentary pension plans that failed the vast majority of working
Americans so profoundly during the 1930s.
Unless one disagrees with Alan Greenspan's assessment that the
cyclical nature of capitalism has not been repealed, 160 the same risks
of loss and failure of private equity that overwhelmed private re-
sources during the Great Depression will continue to apply to a pri-
vate account system. Moreover, while the stock market in the aggre-
gate provides positive long-term growth under most scenarios, the real
rate of return (that is, increase in stock prices minus increase in con-
sumer prices) is not as easy to 'predict. In addition, while the stock
market can affect the distribution of wealth between winners and los-
ers, it does not, over the long run, itself create real economic wealth.
In general the market_ can be expected to keep pace with national
economic growth, just. as indexed Social Security benefits do, as they
keep pace with wage increases befOre retirement and price increases
after retirement, protecting the workers' relative income position at
if'? Senator Nickles states:
A system of personal savings accounts [means that workers] who start work
earlier are rewarded by a system that depends on compounded investment
and returns. Furthermore, because benefits would no kluger be tied to life
expectancy, retirement money would belong to the workers, whether they
lived five years past retirement or twenty. Consequently, low-wage earners
could pass along their remaining benefits to children or grandchildren,
thereby increasing future generations' opportunity for a higher standard of
living.
Id.
ir.'8 See infra notes 212-220 and accompanying text.
'" See infra notes 212-220 and accompanying text.
16° Alan Greenspan, Testimony before the Senate Budget Committee, Federal News
Service, Jan. 26,1095.
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retirement and their consuming power during retirement. Thus,
while a system of private accounts is likely to produce some differ-
ences in the distribution of wealth between winners and losers, there
is no reason to expect a higher level of income for everyone when
compared with payments under Social Security.
The point is reinforced when two more technical issues raised by
the prospect of privatization are considered: the cost of a transition
from the current system to a privatized system and the ongoing ad-
ministrative costs of a personal account system. The transition to a
private account system involves moving from a pay-as-you-go system in
which current taxes pay current benefits to an advance funded system
in which each individual is responsible for saving enough to finance
her own retirement. The problem is that current benefits would still
have to be paid; the working generation, at whatever point privatiza-
tion were to be enacted, would be required to pay for the current
benefits of the retired generation while also advance funding its own
retirement.
While privatization plans recognize the problem of transition
costs and devise various creative ways to spread the burden of double
paying for one generation, 161 the only real solution is to use general
tax revenue, rather than payroll tax revenue, to finance the transition.
There is, however, no way to escape the fact that during the transition
to a private system the working generation would bear the responsibil-
ity for paying for two generations' retirement claims, whichever tax
system might provide the funds. 162 It is remarkable that while privati-
zation advocates believe the baby boomers' children will not be will-
ing to bear the burden of their parents' Social Security benefits, they
nonetheless assume that the boomers or their children will be willing
to pay for two generations' worth of retirement benefits in a transition
to a private plan. 163
161 See Solomon & Barrow, supra note 7, at 18.
162
 Sec Moore, supra note 05, in 157-158 (discussing how different proposals can result
in transition costs ranging from 1.6% additional payroll tax up to about 5%).
16' A recent monograph published by the United Nations examines the transitional
costs involved in shifting from unfunded to funded pension systems in Latin America,
essentially in the Chilean model, and concludes that "in several countries, especially those
with more aged populations and high coverage systems, the pension debt is very high, and
that a switch front unfunded to fully funded systems implies substantial fiscal costs, that
may even turn out to be economically and politically 'inviable...." JORGE BRAVO & AN-
DRAS UTDOFF, TRANSITIONAL FISCAL COSTS AND DEMOCRAPEIIC FACTORS IN SIFIFTING
FROM UNFUNDED TO FUNDED PENSION IN LATIN AMERICA 5, U.N. Doc. 1..C./1. 12&1—P
(1999).
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The other specific cost hurdle, and one that casts considerable
doubt on the "rate of return" argument made by privatization advo-
cates, is the seemingly trivial issue of the administrative costs of main-
taining and investing private accounts. Whatever the shortcomings of
a large government bureaucracy, the costs of administering the Social
Security system are extremely low—about one-half of one percent of
the total outlay in benefits each year. This figure covers salaries of So-
cial Security Administration employees, maintenance of hundreds of
district offices all over the country, computers, and so on. 164
 Adminis-
trative costs are so low because Social Security is a relatively easy pro-
gram to run—its status as an entitlement based on past earnings
means few face-to-face meetings or judgments are required, and most,
if not all, beneficiaries never have occasion to meet with a Social Se-
curity Administration staff person. 165
In contrast, the administrative costs of personal accounts could
amount to as much as 10-25% of the amounts deposited, 166 primarily
in fees paid to investment advisors, stock brokers, and various types of
investment and transaction fees. The experiences of the Chilean and
other government pension programs that have gone private confirm
that the fees required to operate private accounts greatly reduce the
return on individual investments. 167
Finally, the involvement and responsibility Of individuals in man-
aging their own retirement in an individual account system frequently
is presented as a signal advantage in itself.' The implication of these
164 See TRUSTEES' REPoter, supra note 41, at 6 tb1.1.C1 (summary of OASD1 Trust Fund
Operations).
' 83
 This is one contrast that is frequently overlooked by those who call for means-
testing the program. The prospect of checking income and assets of 35 or 40 million
beneficiaries, each month, should give pause to those who would like to increase the "tar-
geting" efficiency of the program through means-testing.
166
 See THomPsoN, supra note 126, at 6. Under a centralized federal model the addi-
tional annual costs are less than 0.1% of the assets under management. Costs are substan-
tially higher where the activities are decentralized. In the United Kingdom, charges aver-
aged around 10%, and in Chile the charge ran about 19% of contributions. See id.
167 See BRAVO & UTHOFF, Supra note 163, at 8 (administrative costs of the Chilean sys-
tem by 1999 were close to 25%).
168
 According to Senator Nickles:
Today, Americans are increasingly aware of the need for long-term financial
planning and are capable of handling their own investments. Indeed, surveys
show that Americans are already investing in the private market and becom-
ing better educated about how it works.... Moreover, they want to have own-
ership over their own futures.
Nickles, supra note 34,106-08.
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encomiums to the widespread use of "capitalist tools," to paraphrase
the Forbes Magazine motto, is that the more individual working
Americans are involved in investing and working with stock portfolios,
the better. It is unclear, however, that such involvement would in fact
be a good thing, from either an economic or social perspective.
Clearly, some individuals have a knack for working with financial in-
struments and investments, while others do not. More significantly,
some have the inclination to be money managers whereas others do
not. The increased focus of American life on investment returns and
stock market performance is assumed by privatization advocates to be
an unalloyed social good. Yet the social costs of this preoccupation
with the mechanisms of investment and the drive for wealth accumu-
lation, at the expense of other forms of social participation—volun-
teer activities, community affairs, politics—have not been taken into
account.
The current popularity of day trading has led to many reports of
lost family savings and homes, as the stock market is in effect used as a
substitute for Las Vegas and Atlantic City casinos. 169 Moreover, as
computer trading makes the stock market more volatile without any
corresponding changes in company performance or prospects, 1 " it
becomes clear that individuals' involvement in managing their. stock
market portfolios is not an unmixed blessing.m One prominent
economist states:
169 See, e.g., Deborah McGregor, Levitt Warns Inquiry of Risks in Day Trading, FIN. TIMES
LONDON, Sept. 17, 1999, at 6; Tom Walker, If Thu Love to Play the Market, Tithe this Test--Thu
May Have a Problem, ATLANTA J. CONS I., jalL. 13, 1994, at F3.
170 See David harboza, N.A.S.D. Chief Cautions Firms about Internet Trading 1?isks, N.Y.
TimEs, Feb. 10, 1999, at C9 (noting scrutiny being directed at day traders, and suggesting
that "day traders are creating volatile and risky markets").
171 In fact, Shiller has characterized the last several years of increases in the stock mar-
ket this way:
The recent high Valuations in the stock market have come about for no good
reasons. The market level does not, as so many imagine, represent the con-
sensus judgment of experts who have carefully weighed the long-term evi-
dence. The market is high because of the combined effect of indifferent
thinking by millions of people, very few of whom feel the need to perform
careful research on the long-term investment value of the aggregate stock
market, and who are motivated substantially by their own emotions, random
attentions, and perceptions of conventional wisdom. Their all-too-human be-
havior is heavily influenced by news media that are interested in attracting
viewers or readers, with limited incentive to discipline their readers with the
type of quantitative analysis that might. give them a correct impression of the
aggregate stock inztrket level.
St CILLER, supra note 147, at 203.
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[It] wouki be a serious mistake to ... [replace] the current
Social Security system with a defined contribution plan for
retirement, investing plan balances in the stock market, or
even a plan that would give individuals a choice of invest-
ment categories. Such a plan would replace the current so-
cietal commitments to the elderly with a hope that financial
markets will do as well as in the past. Adopting such a plan at
a time when the market is at a record high relative to fun-
damentals would be a serious error of historic propor-
tions. 172
I would add to this analysis the suggestion that the ideological
significance of the wider involvement (indeed, close to obsession) of
Americans in managing their retirement funds through a private ac-
count system may be as important to those supporting a private ac-
count system as the economic results. The promotion of private ac-
counts and private property interests as the principal vehicle for
retirement security, in opposition to a social insurance model, is not
simply a campaign for increased autonomy in controlling funds that
would otherwise be redistributed through the public tax and benefit
system. The privatization campaign is a part of the ongoing "corn-
modification" of the culture, in which all values and all activities are
expressed as simply parts of -or factors in the market economy. 173
By forcing all workers to become money managers and invest-
ment consultants, one major effect (if not purpose) of privatization
would be to draw working people, who might otherwise view their
stake in corporate well-being as rather remote, into thinking of them-
selves as capitalists whose fortunes are directly tied to the path of the
stock market and the companies whose stock underwrites their hope
of retirement. This identification of interests in terms of investment
'returns could tend to diminish any public focus on issues such as en-
vironmental destruction or child labor in developing nations or a host
of other problems the solutions to which could affect the stock prices
of the companies involved.
In Id. at 222.
173 See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF
PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL. THOUGHT 1776-1970, at 10 (1997) (arguing that coin-
modification is an essential aspect of modernity); see also BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE COSTS OF
LIVING (1992) (discussing the "marketization" of modern life).
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IL THE PENUMBRA OF PROPERTY RIGHTS—AUTONOMY, PROPERTY
AND RETIREMENT
The vision of retirement in which the private investment account
proposals are generally grounded is that of a naturally occurring stage
of life through which individuals must plan to support themselves, as
through all other phases of life. In this vision, equality of opportunity
and access to the market are all that is necessary to maximize aggre-
gate and individual well-being supported by private property rights
accumulated throughout life. 174 Private account advocates are thus
understandably skeptical of government income entitlements that
effectively interfere with the workings of the market and that are
backed only by collective will in the form of government action rather
than indisputable private ownership. 175
Surprisingly, however, suppOrters of the current Social Security
system, as well as those who do not explicitly support social insurance
but who do support income or equity redistribution in some form,
appear almost as committed to property rights as the basis for indi-
vidual income security as are supporters of private account systems. 176
As a result, Social Security's supporters have had a difficult time de-
veloping a theory of economic rights that reconciles the redistribu-
tion of income inherent in social welfare programs with the control
and possession ideals at the heart of the general notion of private
property rights.'"
This section will examine the difficulty of breaking the link be-
tween equity and income rights in social welfare programs from the
perspective of the advocate of income redistribution, starting with a
discussion of the theories of "rights" and "entitlements" in which the
arguments for and against social insurance are grounded. The next
section discusses sonic historical- aspects of the development of Social
Security, including its roots in nineteenth century veterans' benefits,
the program's enactment in the 1930s in response to the Great De-
174 ID this regard, see Martha Nussbaum, Unman Rights Theory: Capabilities and Human
flights, 66 FoRonmu L. REV. 273, 274 (1997), for a cogent discussion of the relationship
between rights and welfare and the different types of equality, including well-being. re-
sources, opportunity, or capabilities.
175 See generally, e.g., Nickles, supra note 34.
'76 See infra notes 255-265 and accompanying text.
177 See Robert W. Gordon, Paradoxical Properly, in EARLY MODERN CONCEPTIONS OF
PROPERTY 95, 95 ( John Brewer & Susan Staves eds., 1996) ("The ideology of property as
absolute dominion has many sources.... Yet ... these very different sources. ... Fiend] to
converge.... in the model form of property as absolute individual right").
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pression, and its expansion up until the 1980s. The principal question
is how the pension analogy, used to explain the program at its incep-
tion, was transformed from comparison to equivalence.
Next, I look at attempts, beginning in the 1970s and best repre-
sented by Charles Reich's theory of the "New Property," to give public
income benefits a "rights" based legal status. 178 These efforts were
principally designed to provide protection for recipients of welfare
benefits by redefining them as a "new property" subject to constitu-
tional due process rights, thus preventing loss of benefits without a
hearing or appeal proceSs. 179 This attempt to recast welfare into prop-
erty is widely conceded to have failed, even by Reich himself. 180
 It is
nonetheless worth examining, to see that the common element in the
approach of Reich and successive theorists of redistribution is the
dominance of the property right leitmotif and the limitations that de-
votion to equity-based economic rights has imposed on their analy-
ses.'"
One driving force behind Reich's efforts seems to have been the
phenomenon of public support for Social Security as contrasted with
the lack of support for welfare benefits often decried by social welfare
advocates and historians. 182
 I suggest that this distinction may reveal a
cultural acceptance of an alternative theory of economic rights linked
to the workmanship ideal that provides a more complete explanation
for the source of public support for, as well as a substantive right to,
Social Security, in contrast to need-based benefit programs.
A. A Question of Rights
The least explored aspect of the debate over the future of Social
Security is the legal and theoretical basis for the claims presented in
the public and private models. The claim represented by Social Secu-
rity benefits is a statutory claim, created by past work effort of the in-
178 See Reich, New Property, supra note 26, at 785.
179
 See id.
Hu See Charles Reich, Symposium On The Trends In Legal Citations And Scholarship: Property
Law And The New Economic Order: A Betrayal Of Middle Americans And The Poor; 71 Cm.-KENT.
L. REV. 817, 819 (1996) [hereinafter Reich, Symposium] . For one major critique of Reich's
approach, see generally William H. Simon, Rights and Redistribution in the Welfare System, 38
STAN. L. REV. 1431 (1986).
See genemlly Reich, New Property, supra note 26.
182
 See generally LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MoTtIERS AND THE
HISTORY OF WELFARE 1890-1930 (1994) [hereinafter GORDON, PITIED NOT ENTITLED];
MICIIAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL Ilts4oRY OF WELFARE IN
AMERICA (1986).
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dividuali on a portion of the futUre productivity of the work force at
large and unmediated by any equity interest. The private savings
model also constitutes a claim on, future productivity, but only on that
part of future productivity steaming from the equity or property in-
terest that is owned by the individual. Both public and private claims
inevitably must be satisfied out of economic production at the time
they are cashed in; the critical difference between the two is how each
claim is secured—by private property rights or by the pliblic political
process.
The debate over old age security is essentially a philosophical ar-
gument over autonomy and the nature of economic rights. It is an
argument steeped in the rhetoriCal and symbolic value each side at-
taches to private property rights. Proponents of maintaining Social
Security as it is currently configured have basic goals that are very
similar to those of the privatizatiOn advocates—to promote . autonomy
and prevent demeaning dependence in old age.' 83 Privatization advo-
cates, however, generally assume that private claims on future income
that are based on a property right (some form of equity that will pro-
duce a stream of income in retirement) are superior to the public
claim represented. by Social Sectirity. 184 This public claim is dismissed
by these analysts as at best "political" or artificial in some way, at worst
a shell game, and in any event not anything remotely resembling a
"right" on a par with individual property rights. 185
It is possible,. however, that 'the public entitlement governed by
the public political process may ultimately be a more secure right and
a better way to insure income security in retirement than the private
claim, even without regard to such normative issues as redistributional
equity.' 86 Over the past thirty years, legal theorists, Most notably Char-
les Reich in his classic essay "The New Property, "187 and later, from
different perspectives, Akhil Amar, 188 and Bruce Ackerman and Anne
Alstott, 189 have attempted to legitimize the "rights" status of redistribu-
tive benefits by either redefining public entitlements as a type of pri-
183 See, e.g., Robert M. Ball & Thomas N. Bethel!, Bridging the Centuries: The Case for Tra-
ditional Social _security, in SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE 21sT CENTURY, supra note 67, at 259,
261; see also Solomon &,Barrow, supra note 7, at 9.
-184 See generally Soloinon & Barrow, supra note 7.
185 See id.
186 See infra notes 270-283 and accompanying text.
187 Reich, Neil, Property, supra note 26.
188
 Akhil Amar, Forty Acres and a Mule: A Republican Theory of Minimal Entitlement, 13
1IARV.J.L. & Putt:POCY 37 (1990).
185 BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY (1999).
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vate property right, or securing their legal status by linking them to
actual redistribution of propertym
I suggest here that, in contrast to the line of thinking promoted
by Reich, it is possible, and in fact necessary, to think about economic
entitlement in retirement as something other than a property right. If
citizenship brings with it the right to civic participation, can a lifetime
of work in the market economy produce the right to an income
stream in retirement based on past effort without an intervening
property right from which that stream of income is derived?ol This
proposition requires consideration of the basis of rights generally and
economic rights in particular and also some examination of the
significance of public expectations about what creates rights. 192
I argue that the public belief that a right, in the form of a Social
Security benefit, has been created through work and payment of taxes
is not simply a charmingly naive fable. On the contrary, this public
perception, which is supported by a broad based political will to main-
tain Social Security generally, and individual benefits in particular, in
fact creates a real right whose existence is necessary to protect the
public institution of retirement—an institution which was specifically
created and whose growth was encouraged by business and govern-
ment alike to meet economic needs. 193
This suggestion of course raises the question of whether such
economic rights are protected, as are property rights, by a Constitu-
tional right to due process. Reich attempted to settle this issue for wel-
fare recipients by redefining welfare payments as property rights that
would therefore be governed by constitutional; due process require-
ments, most notably a hearing and review process before such rights
could be lost. 194
 In the retirement context, however, due process is-
sues rarely arise once initial satisfaction of eligibility requirements is
established, 195
IS° See infra notes 242-2& and accompanying text.
191
 Some interesting current work on the nature of citizenship has centered 011 the no-
tion of economic citizenship in the context of economic globalization. See generally Linda
Rosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447 (2000).
192
 For an illuminating discussion of connections between public rights and social
norms, see Richard McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L.
Rev. 338 (1997).
193 See infra notes 199-235 and accompanying text.
194 Reich, New Aoperty, supra note 26, at 778-86.
199 An extensive review of Social Security cases in the federal courts reveals no cases al-
ter a 1950s case dealing with deportation of a member of the Communist Party, which
involved depriving a primary recipient of benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act
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It seems that due process concerns (and the resulting attempts to
base all economic rights on property rights) apply almost solely where
the rights in question are taken away. 196 Retirement income rights, in
contrast, are intended to be permanent—as they must be if they are to
fulfill their function in support of the retirement institution and are
rarely if ever lost once the initial eligibility requirements are met. Due
process is necessary for the orderly deprivation, not preservation, of
rights; as a result, due process is not a relevant concern in the retire-
ment income context.
The importance of permanent entitlement specifically in the
context of retirement benefits, and as the basis of the retirement deci-
sion, is often overlooked but in fact can scarcely be overemphasized.
The clear distinction between earnings-based entitlements (Social Se-
curity essentially) and poverty-based benefits (Aid to Families with
Dependant Children prior to the recent welfare reform legislation,
Social Security Insurance currently, and state welfare programs) that
social welfare advocates have long deplored is the hallmark of a right
to economic security in old age that is founded not on property but
on a workmanship ideal of rights and entitlentent. 197
The real significance of this distinction is that entitlement, based
on statutory criteria, and essentially non-reviewable by bureaucratic
authority, is inherently democratic, immunized from ad hoc decision-
making, and respectful of individual autonomy and dignity. In con-
trast, public charity in the form of welfare payments made only to the
needy through a hierarchical, top-down, evaluative process dependent
on personal characteristics (income, assets, family status, drug or al-
cohol use, etc.) is inherently manipulative, degrading and undemo-
cratic. 198 The history of Social Security in America supports the notion
once in benefit status, except for cases dealing with erroneous overpayments which, by
statute, were allowed to he recouped. See, e.g., Cagan° v. Ymasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979).
156 See infia notes 236-253 and accompanying text.
197 William Simon's analysis of Reich's "new property" and social insurance well illus-
trates the liberal distaste for the distinction between poverty-based and earnings-based
entitlements. See generally Simon, supra note 180.
198 For a discussion of the concept of entitlement in the welfare context, and the im-
pact of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996, Pub. L. Nu. 104-
193, 110 Stat. 2279, which eliminated the few entitlement protections that existed under
the old AFDC program, leaving recipients completely vulnerable to state and local
administrative actions, see Sylvia Law, Ending Wetfore As We Know ii, 49 SIAN. L. Rare. 471,
483-88 (1997). For the classic indictment of welfare as a means of social control, see
generally FRANCES Fox PivEr4 Ricumto CLowAttu, REouLATINc, Tun PooR: THE
FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE (2d ed. 1993).
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that the work-based retirement entitlement was not simply an acci-
dental result of the New Deal response to the Great Depression.
B. Roots of Income Entitlement: Social Security and the Pension Analogy
Lack of historical perspective frequently plagues policy debates,
and nowhere has the absence of historical knowledge been more
damaging than in the Social Security discussion. 199 It is not only in-
structive to examine the origins of the Social Security system and the
institution of retirement in this context, it is essential in order to un-
derstand why income rights based on earnings may be more rooted in
American tradition than is generally realized and why the property-
based pension and annuity system proved so inadequate in the 1930s,
prompting enactment of Social Security. Finally, some sense of the
historical development of voluntary retirement is critical to under-
standing the institutional importance of the income entitlement. It is
fair to say that retirement did not prompt the development of Social
Security but rather the reverse—the enactment of Social Security
made middle-class retirement possible.
1. Retirement and Entitlement in American History
The origins of the earnings-based entitlement concept substan-
tially pre-date the economic crisis of the Great Depression, although
retirement was not the. original focus of such entitlements. 200 Public
income rights, in the form of government benefits for veterans and
their families, and thus based on public service rather than on equity,
were the immediate and widely experienced precedent for Social Se-
curitym While government support for needy elderly was well-
established both in Great Britain and in the American colonies as a
form of "outdoor" poor relief (as opposed to incarceration in poor-
houses) provided to elderly poor with local residence or family ties,
199
 Mitch of the historical discussion in both the Solomon and Barrow and the Nickles
articles is inaccurate, particularly the notion that there was no substantial history of gov-
ernment support for the poor or for the elderly prior to enactment of Social Security. See,
e.g., Solomon & Barrow, supra note 7, at 10 ("Before the adoption of the Social Security Act
of 1935, the public sector played only a limited role and the federal government a virtually
nonexistent one in combating poverty.")
2a° I have explored the origins and evolution of Social Security and retirement end-
dements in more detail in an earlier article, from which much of the discussion here is
drawn. See Patricia E. Dilley, The Evolution of Entitlement, 30 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1063,1085-39
(1997).
2° 1 See id.
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regularized government pensions can be said to have originated in
benefits awarded to needy veterans of the Revolutionary War in rec-
ognition of their service to the new republic. 202
The scope of the Revolutionary War pensions was fairly limited,
. as initial entitlement was based not only on war service but also on
demonstrated need. 203 The much larger scale and carnage of the Civil
War, however, resulted in a Union army veterans' pension program
(with a counterpart for Confederate veterans eventually established by
the former Confederate states) that developed by the early twentieth
century into the first federal social welfare program, comparable in
benefits and numbers of beneficiaries to the general social welfare
programs then being established in Europe. 204 Moreover, these
benefits were paid not only to the veterans themselves but to their
widows and orphans; thus, by 1910 about 18% of all Americans aged
sixty-five and older were beneficiaries of the program, roughly com-
parable to the percentage of Europeans then receiving social welfare
benefits under government pension programs.20 This was at a time
when most men over age sixty-five continued in the paid labor force,
and retirement was not yet. an expectation of the majority of Ameri-
can workers. 2°6
Members of the generation that reached its forties and fifties in
the midst of the Great DepressiOn were thus probably familiar with
the concept of government-supplied benefits based on service, as they
were likely to have had parents, other relations or acquaintances in
the older generation who had received substantial income in old age
from the federal government as -an entitlement unrelated to need. 207
Thus, the notion that the program sprang without precedent from
202 See id. at 1095-96; see a/soJohn R Resell, Federal Welfare for Revolutionary War . Veterans,
56 Soc. SERV. REV. 171,172 (1982).
203 SiT Dilley, supra note 200, at 1095-96.
204 SPeTHEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS
Or SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 102-151 (1992). Skocpol states that "lblerween
1880 and 1910, the U.S. federal government devoted Over a quarter of its expenditures to
pensions distributed among the populace.... By 1910, about 28% of all American men
aged 65 or mote, more than half a million of them, received federal benefits averaging
$189 a year." Id. at 65.
200 See id. at 132.
200 See Brian Gratton, The Creation of Retirement: Families. Individuals, & the Social Security
Movement, in SOCIETAL IMPACT ON AGING: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 63-68 (K. Warner
Schaie & W. Andrew Achenbaum eds., 1993); see also Wiley, supra note 200, at 1102-1106
(discussing industrialization and beginnings of voluntary retirement).
207 If Civil War soldiers were 18 to 30 when they entered service in 1861, their children
would have been born:primarily between 1855 and 1890, so that when the Great fkpres- •
siotr hit in 1929, those Children would have been middle-aged to elderly adidts theniselves.
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the minds of the New Deal brain trust, an aberration in the American
tradition of self-relianCe and rejection of government assistance, 208 is
simply wrong. The Social Security earnings-based entitlement in fact
has substantial nineteenth century historical roots and is consistent
with an American tradition of service-based, rather than poverty-
based, government benefit programs.
2. The Failure of Private Property Rights
Of course, during the last half of the nineteenth century, at the
time the Civil War pension system was being expanded to cover all
veterans and their widows, most older Americans still worked on fam-
ily farms—a setting in which formal retirement was not common even
as the transition to industrialization and urbanization was begin-
ning, 289
 All members of the farm family would typically work at what-
ever tasks they were capable of undertaking, from youngest to oldest,
so that a gradual diminution of responsibilities would result eventually
in de facto retirement. 2 1 8
 Nonetheless, even in this setting, the older
generation might seek to guarantee support from the younger gen-
eration through control of ownership and the conditioning of inheri-
tance on maintenance of the elder until death. 21 1
Industrialization, however, brought the need for employers to
find a way to ease aging workers out of the factory or firm through
the use of industrial pensions. 212 Even though the majority of men
over age sixty-five continued to work in paid employment until after
World War IL company pensions began to be used more extensively as
the pace of industrialization accelerated. 21 5 At the time of the stock
market crash in 1929, however, only a small minority of American
workers were covered by private pension plans and an even smaller
206 See, e.g., Solomon & BarrOw, supra note 7, at 10.
200 See generally HAIIER & GRATTON, supra note 16; DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, GROWING
OLD IN AMERICA (1978).
210 See W. ANDREW ACIIENBAUM, SOCIAL SECURITY: VISIONS AND REVISIONS 105 (1986).
211 See
212 See James A, Wooten, The 'Original Intent' Of The Federal Tax Treatment Of Private Pen-
sion Plans, 85 Tax NOTES 1305,1307-08 (1999).
2" See DAN M. McGum, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 16-17 (3d ed. 1975); see
also WILLIAM C. GREENOUGH & FRANCIS P. KING, PENSION PLANS AND PUBLIC POLICY 27-
30 (1976). Most discussions of the extent of private pensions in this period draw on
Murray Laiimer's extensive contemporaneous survey of private pension plans, in which he
estimated that about 400 industrial pension plans were established between 1875 and 1929
by companies employing less than 10% of the total labor force. Less than half of those em-
ployees would have ever qualified for benefits under those plans. See MURRAY W. LATIMER,
INDUSTRIAL PENSION SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 42-48 (1932).
September 2000]	 Social Seen ify Privatization	 1029
percentage could ever expect to draw benefits because of long vesting
periods and eligibility terms that often required the worker to be em-
ployed by the firm at the time of retirement in order to receive
benefits. 214 Moreover, most pension plans were not funded in ad-
vance, or were inadequately funded, as no legal funding requirement
was imposed on employers until much later. 215
The minority of workers who did stop working in old age—most
much later than sixty-five—were supported, once the Civil War veter-
ans had died out, by private equity-based retirement plans: either in-
formal (family farm income maintenance arrangements or personal
savings) or formal (private annuities purchased with accumulated sav-
ings or, probably less commonly, employer provided pensions). 216
Elderly Americans dependent on these private arrangements were
completely vulnerable to the collapse in equity values generally that
followed in the wake of the 1929 crash and the ensuing world-wide
economic depression.217 As banks failed taking savings accounts with
them and a downward price spiral ensued taking clown all sorts of
214 &VANN ORLOFF, TILE POLITICS OF PENSIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF' BRITAIN,
CANADA AND THE UNITED STATEs 1880-1940, at 278-79 (1993).
215 See GREENouGH & KING, supra note 213, at 38. According to James Wooten:
In tin: second and third decades of the twentieth century, it became clear t hat
the paras-you-go approach was Ito way to manage pension costs. In the 191 Os,
a number of public employers encountered cash shortages when the costs of
their plans rapidly increased out of all proportion to expectations. The same
problem hit many private firms in the 1920s. By 1915 this pattern of escalat-
ing costs produced financial difficulties and reorganizations of teacher pen-
sion plans in a number of cities and states. In the same year, the U.S. Steel
pension plan amended its age and service requirements in the face of rising
costs  Another plan based on Carnegie's largesse, that of the Carnegie
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, reorganized several years later
fOr similar reasons. These events and others like the much publicized failure
of the pension plan of Morris & Co. in the mid 1920s gave credence to the
warnings of the Inv generation of American pension specialists that pensions
would be secure only if employers funded these obligations in advance.
Wooten, supra note 212, at 1307-08.
215 See JILL QUADAGNO, TOE. TRANSFORMATION OF OLD AGE. SECURITY: CLASS AND
POLITICS IN T1 IE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 78-79 (1988); see also Miley, supat note 200, at
1115-19.
217 in terms of its impact on economic performance. the depression -was a disaster
without equal in the twentieth century. The contraction phase of the depression, extend-
ing front August 19'29 to March 1933, saw the most severe decline in key economic aggre-
gates in the annals of U.S. business cycle history. Real GNI' fell by more than one-third, as
did the price level. Industrial production declined by more than 50%. Unemployment rose
to 25 percent by 3933." introduction to THE DEFINING MOMENT: THE GREAT DEPRESSION
AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (Michael I). Wird() et al. eds.,
1998)1hereinafter DEFINING MOMENT].
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property values, unemployment mounted and wages fell, depleting
the ability of working age children to support their elderly relatives. 218
The impact on sources of retirement and old age income was
stark: funded pension plans went bankrupt along with the banks their
funds were held in; unfunded plans stopped paying benefits as em-
ployers closed their doors; and savings accounts disappeared. 219 Since
most men over age sixty-five were still in the labor force, the high
rates of unemployment probably affected them as much as the loss of
pensions. Nonetheless, it is fair to say that the rudimentary pension
arrangements in place at the time of the Depression, primarily based
on private ownership equity principles, were -overwhelmed by the
drop in values that resulted from the economic downward spiral.
It is important to fully appreciate that there was no widespread
retirement system or expectation in place prior to the enactment of
Social Security. As a result, no precedent existed for mass retirement,
in which almost all of the population over the retirement age stops
working and is adequately supported by a fully private savings or pen-
sion system. Moreover, when the private pension system was revital-
ized in the 1930s in conjunction with thé development of social insur-
ance programs, including unemployment insurance as well as Social
Security retirement and survivors insurance, it was a result as much of
the efforts of industry to control labor force exits in an orderly fash-
ion as of pressure from workers seeking more generous retirement
income support. 2"
3. The New Deal and the "Property Right" Concept of Entitlement
The genesis of Social Security as the cornerstone of New Deal
social welfare programs need not be described in great detail here. 221
However, a brief examination of the historical yoots of the current
program explains why the private pension metaphor was so consis-
218 See COLIN GORDON, NEW DEALS: BUSINESS, LABOR, AND POLITICS IN AMERICA,
1920-1935, at 160 (1994) [hereinafter GORDON, NEW DEALS]; see also IIABER & GRATTON,
supra note 16, at 42.
219 See GORDON. NEW DEALS, supra note 218, at 160.
220
 For an extended analysis of the cooperation between business interests and New
Deal reformers in developing both Social Security and private pensions, see generally
GORDON, NEW DEALS, supra note 218.
20
 Among the numerous accounts of the enactment of Social Security are the follow-
ing: J. DOUGLAS BROWN, Sllpra note 125; ORLOFF, supra note 214; QUADAGNO, supra note
216; and GRAEBNER, supra note 16. For a general recent history of the New Deal era, see
generally DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN DEPRESSION
AND WAR, 1929-1945 (1999).
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tendy employed to describe both the benefits and the financing of a
public social entitlement that differs significantly from the private
model in critical respects. The New Deal policy designers who -engi-
neered the enactment of Social Security, especially President Roose-
velt himself, apparently had as much difficulty envisioning an income
right without a basis in property as more recent analysts have had. As
a result, the financing mechanism of the program was tied so closely
to the benefit entitlement structure that benefits were advertised as
being paid for by the workers who were earning them and paying
FICA taxes along with their employers. This perilous metaphor leads,
as discussed above, to confused and misleading "money's worth" ar-
guments about Social Security.
The first "original intent" issue is how the Social Security system
both resembles and differs from the private pension design; the dif-
ferences help to explain why the financing analogy is so faulty. When
looked at together, the 1935 and 1939 Social Security Acts essentially
put in place all the basic features of the Social Security retirement and
survivors' insurance programs as they exist today: entitlement based
on earnings reflecting a long term attachment to the paid work force;
pay-as-you-go financing; and a benefit formula weighted in favor of
low income workers.222
The entire point of combining entitlement based on earnings
with redistributive benefits was to prevent working people from falling
into poverty in old age, while avoiding targeting and means testing. 225
It was assumed that all able-bodied workers (men, primarily, and
women without small children) would be in the paid labor force
(once the economy recovered) and thus would earn a right to
benefits to insure against poverty caused by the specific anticipated
eventuality of inability to work in old age, just as unemployment in-
surance was put in place for the eventuality of unemployment. 224
Benefit payments were accelerated in 1939 to begin before any worker
could have paid in FICA taxes any amount approximating the cost of
a lifetime monthly annuity; this was a change which reflected, along
with the redistributive benefit formula, the substantial anti-poverty
purpose of the program.225 The immediate goal of fighting poverty
222 See AN'ilbur J. Cohen, The Development of the Soda! Security Act of 1933: Reflections Some
Fifty Years Learn 68 MINN. L. Ray. 379, 406, 408 (1983); see also BROWN, St4pra note 125, at
44-56.
225 See CES REPORT, supra note 81, at 45.
224 Sec Cohen, supra note 222, at 388, 407.
225 Sec1)illey, supra note 200, at 1123-24, 1128.
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during the Depression, however, was intended to be achieved with the
needs-based Old Age Assistance program, not Social Security, which
was designed primarily with a view toward the future, not the present
financial emergency. 226
Far from assuming that most workers would not live long enough
to retire and collect substantial benefits, the Committee on Economic
Security, appointed by President Roosevelt to make the recommenda-
tions that led to the 1935 Social Security Act, based its report on data
showing a life expectancy at age sixty-five of ten to fifteen more
years. 227
 While retirement was not the expectation or the practice of
the majority of American workers over sixty-five at the time, business
interests in the United States and the rest of the industrialized world
had already begun to appreciate the value of regular retirement as a
labor force management too1. 228
 At a time of 50% unemployment,
institutionalizing retirement through Social Security was one way to
ease older workers out of the labor force in an orderly fashion, free-
ing up employment opportunities for younger workers. 229 Although
job creation was hardly the primary reason for establishment of Social
Security, the program's tole as an enduring institution providing re-
tirement income to almost all American workers was an anticipated
consequence of the basic design of the program. 28°
However, the features of the program most likely to make retire-
ment possible for lower and middle wage workers—family benefits
without reduction in the basic worker's benefit amount and redistri-
bution in the benefit formula in favor of low-wage workers—are for-
eign to the purposes and design of private pensions, precisely because
the concern for adequate benefits available to all workers is a public
interest, not a private one. The risks against which social insurance
protects should be viewed as broader than simple unemployment and
poverty because of old age. The range of risks against which the social
insurance entitlement guards include the .risk of underemployment
throughout a working life, periods out of the work force that lower
total retirement savings, and inadequate education and training that
lead to low lifetime wages—in short, the risks of poverty during life
226 SeeththoFr, supra note 214, at 290-92.
227 See CES REPORT, supra note 81, at 25 ("Men who reach 65 still have on the average
11 or 12 years of life before them; women 15 years").
228 See GORDON, NEW DEALS, supra note 218, at 248.
229 See KENNEDY, supra note 221, at 257.
230 See CES REPORT, .supra note 81, at 5 ("The satisfactory way of providing for the old
age of those now young is a contributory system of old-age annuities").
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despite a substantial and regular work history that would make an
adequate retirement income in the absence of a public entitlement
unlikely if not impossible.
Yet the financing mechanism of the payroll tax was seen by Presi-
dent Roosevelt as the necessary equivalent of private pension
financing—a product of his fiscal conservatism and revulsion against
the repeated increases in the last public pension system (veterans
benefits) brought about by insistent lobbying without any regard for
fiscal restraint. 231 President Roosevelt remarked some years after the
original acts were passed that he understood the regressive results of
financing Social Security with payroll tax "contributions" but that
there were strong reasons for using them rather than the income tax:
I guess you're right on the economics, but those taxes were
never a problem of economics. They are politics all the way
through. We put those payroll contributions there so as to
give the contributors a legal, moral and political right to col-
lect their pensions and their unemployment benefits. With
those taxes in there, no damn politician can ever scrap my
social security program. 232
President Roosevelt's intention to create a property right rather
than a civil right was part of an overall political strategy framed by a
fundamental philosophy of fiscal restraint and aversion to poverty-
based government aid. 233 The functional result was the protection of a
vulnerable social program with the veneer of the private pension; a
right that has been paid for seemed less likely to be taken away than
onegranted by the grace of the body politic. This insistence on mod-
eling the social insurance program as closely as possible on private
insurance reveals, according to some commentators, an adherence to
the principles of private law jurisprudence. 234
 From this perspective,
251 See ORLon?, supra note 214, at 290 ("Roosevelt and Witte, reacting to a policy in-
heritance which dramatized the dangers ,of politically motivated expansion Of benefits,
were determined to keep the federal government out of tile business of giving direct
grants to citizens and never wavered from a commitment to contributory features for
whatever permanent old age program was settled on.").
232 FRANCES PERKINS, TILE ROOSEVELT I KNEW 281 (1946).
253 See KENNEDY, sepia note 221, at 266.
2" According to William Simon:
Perhaps the central substantive theme of liberal welfare discourse is the anal-
ogy of welfare benefits to traditional private law norms associated with con-
tract and property. The private law analogy is in turn linked to au ideal of in-
dividual independence and self-sufficiency and to an ambition to immunize
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the linkage between payroll tax financing and benefit payments was
not only a politically astute cover, it was a logical necessity in the
minds of President Roosevelt and those of his advisors who resisted
the addition of any redistributive features to the social insurance pro-
gram.235
 The goals of autonomy in old age and insulation of the eld-
erly from the manipulative and degrading requirements of needs-
based programs seemed to be inevitably paired with the trappings of a
private purchased contract right: the dedicated tax; a trust fund for
the collection of revenues; and an accounting mechanism designed to
mimic the private pension model to the greatest extent possible.
But the internal design of the program belies the appearance of a
purchased annuity, not only because benefits are based on earnings
rather than contributions, but more importantly because the overall
benefit design satisfies socially determined goals of poverty preven-
tion and induced exit from the labor force, not simply the individual
need to insure income in old age. The most important distinction be-
twee ►
 Social Security and welfare programs derives from its distinctly
different purpose and time frame, not the lack of means-testing. So-
cial Security was designed to meet socially determined needs with a
future orientation, that is, to enable and encourage the working
population to retire based on a permanent and guaranteed entitle-
ment to lifetime benefits, a predicate for retirement itself. Welfare
programs, on the other hand, are designed to meet immediate indi-
vidual .needs caused by poverty or unemployment resulting from po-
litically acceptable causes such as motherhood in the pre-welfare re-
form AFDC program, needs that are assumed (and hoped) to be
temporary.
Moreover, despite President Roosevelt's misgivings about incur-
ring large "unfunded liabilities" by accelerating benefit payments be-
fore a pool of payroll tax revenue had built up, the public retirement
entitlement cannot by its nature be advance funded. As discussed
above, the Social Security trust fund books show surplus FICA tax
revenues, but what do those surpluses really represent? Since con-
sumption can only occur, and benefits can only be paid, in the pres-
ent, current surpluses mean little in actual financial terms. The trust
distributive arrangements from collective reassessment and revision. On a
practical level; it is linked to an aversion to direct or explicit redistribution,
and especially to need-based or means-tested redistribution.
See Simon, supra note 180, at 1432.
235 See id,
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hinds actually signify the political will and commitment to pay
benefits as they come due—the enforcement of a public right—
whether through FICA tax or general income tax revenues.
The private plan, in contrast, must be funded with a genuine
trust precisely because it is a private contractual obligation. The pen-
sioner's claim on goods and services in retirement must be supported
by benefits paid by the employer who has accumulated sufficient re-
sources, in the form of a trust, to satisfy each participant's claim.
Moreover, the size of the obligation is determined by individual con-
tractual relationship, that is, the terms of the pension plan which set
the benefit formula and other conditions in order to satisfy strictly
personal and individual, needs for retirement income that will support
the desired (or allowed, for most employees) standard of living in re-
,tirement.
The public retirement entitlement is a public obligation designed
to protect the public interest in social stability and orderly labor force
exit by the elderly.. The public entitlement is backed by the public tax-
ing power and meets the public need for assurance of old age income
security for all workers through redistribution of tax revenues. The
notion of public advance "funditig," and indeed the emphasis of the
Original designers of Social Sechrity on payroll tax financing as the
equivalent of private pension contributions, is an example of a useful
analogy taking over the analysis, and distorting the comparison be-
yond meaningful limits.
C. The New Property—Reich and the Wrong Box
The pervasiveness and persistence of the "property equals rights"
paradigm is thus essentially common ground between those who
would eliminate Social Security and the New Deal authors of the pro-
gram. Moreover, the property metaphor has proved equally powerful
and limiting for those advocating recognition of the concept of enti-
tlement in provisions for the pOor in the years following the New
Dea1.256
 Thirty years after the New Deal designers of Social Security
insisted on the property right equation as political security for the
program, the social welfare law advocates of the 1960s and 1970s were
faced with an uncomfortable (in their view) divide in the perception
of social 'insurance entitlements based on earnings and means-tested
welfare benefits. From their perspective, the earnings-based entitle-
i3 See infra notes 255-266.
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ment programs essentially preempted all poverty-based social welfare
programs from achieving the same level of public acceptance and
support. 237
All of the federal, programs, both means-tested and earnings-
based, originated in the same legislative efforts during ,the New Deal,
and while the system was viewed as a whole by many of the designers
of what President Roosevelt himself characterized as a "cradle to
grave" structure,238
 the distinction between earnings-based and
means-tested programs was clear in their minds. 239 This distinction
has been criticized by numerous analysts who see the differential in
political and public acceptance of social insurance and welfare pro-
grams as an example of hostility to redistribution of income generally,
and contempt for the poor in particular.240
 Many recent analyses ref-
use to draw the distinction, referring to all federal benefits payments
as "income transfers" or "virelfare." 241
Despite the professional policymakers' resistance, the public and
political leaders continued to support expansion of the social insur-
237
 Historians have chronicled several factors contributing to the lack of public support
and respect for welfare programs aimed at the poor. Clearly racism was one factor as the
African-American migration to northern cities, which accelerated in pace in the post-war
period, changed the public (if not the real) face of welfare clientele in the 1960s. See
NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE PROMISED LAND: THE GREAT BLACK MIGRATION AND How IT
CHANGED AMERICA 194 (1992); see a1S0 JACQUELINE JONES, THE DISPOSSESSED: AMERICA'S
UNDERCLASSES FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO THE PRESENT 272-73 (1992).
238 PERKINS, supra note 232, at 283.
2" See Simon, supra note 180, at 1451 ("The dominant influence on the [Social Secu-
rity] Act was Roosevelt, and the dominant influence on RooSevelt was a commitment to
private law analogies and a concomitant distaste for public assistance.... Roosevelt consis-
tently sought to minimize federal involvement in public assistance and to extirpate any
resemblance to public assistance from the social insurance programs.").
240
 Simon is particularly harsh in his assessment of the rights-based rhetoric of Social
Security in contrast to the implicit unworthiness attributed to recipients of public assis-
tance—"the dole," in Roosevelt's terms. See id. at 1449-53. For an extended discussion of
the stigma attached to welfare but not to Social Security benefits, see generally GORDON,
PITIED NOT ENTITLED, sepia note 182.
241 See e.g., Lynn A. Baker, The Prices of Rights: Toward a Positive Theory of Unconstitutional
Conditions, 75 CORNELL L. REV. '1485, 1186 n.2 (1990). Baker states:
By "public assistance" I mean all government-provided "necessities of life,"
whether in the form of a cash grant or in-kind aid. Such benefits include food
stamps, medical care, and cash grants to those unable for various reasons to
earn a subsistence income. 1 mean, therefore, to include not only "welfare,"
but also non-need-based income maintenance insurance schemeS such as
Unemployment Compensation and Social Security, which provide cash grants
to the unemployed, some of whom might have savings and other assets
sufficient to provide them a subsistence income even in the absence of paid
employment.
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ance model throughout the post-war period and to hold fast. to the
stigma attached to means-tested benefits. in this setting, some advo-
cates attempted to develop a theoretical basis for welfare benefits that
would provide them with the status of legal rights beyond the earn-
ings-based, private property metaphor that defined Social Security in
the public mind. The most prominent of these efforts was Charles
Reich's 1964 essay The New Property, which asserted a property status
for welfare benefits in an attempt to provide a new protection against
arbitrary removal of subsistence rights. 242
Reich argued that because industrialization had stripped from
individuals their "economic citizenship"—that is, the means to pro-
vide for themselves through land available for the taking as had been
the prevailing model at the time of the Revolution and the writing of
the Constitution—the political rights spelled out in the Constitution
had become meaningless for a large segment of the population by the
time of the Great Depression. 245 The New Deal, according to Reich,
was a bargained-for surrendering of power to the new regulatory state
in exchange for economic protections for those whose access to eco-
nomic citizenship had shriveled:
The New Property argued that, if the new social contract was
to be respected, welfare state protections and benefits for
the middle class and the poor must be treated as entitle-
ments—a substitute for old forms of property....Only if the
new forms of wealth were protected by both substantive and
procedural due process would the New Deal prove to be not
merely a one-way transfer of power to the state, but a two-way
bargain, with the people receiving a quid pro quo of eco-
nomic rights in return. 244
Thus, Reich's vision of securing the welfare entitlement was based on
characterizing it as a form of property which would then be governed
by due process rights—substantive and procedura1. 245 In the years fol-
lowing the publication of The New Property, as part of the same opti-
mism about the possibilities of redefining and expanding constitu-
tional protections to the poor, poverty lawyers and academics
attempted to extend Reich's theory from the law reviews into public
policy via the federal courts. They aimed to establish a constitutional
242 see
 generally Reich, New Property, s epta note 26.
243 See Reich, Symposium, supra note 180, at 818-19.
244 See id.
245
 See id.
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right under the due process clause to a hearing before benefits could
be terminated, as a logical consequence of treating welfare benefits as
property. 246
 After a few initial victories, however, the effort largely
failed. 247
Completely separate from the battle waged in the courts to in-
crease the level of procedural protections afforded welfare recipients,
the whole structure of federal welfare came under sustained political
attack. After two decades of criticism, much of it based in political cal-
culation and racial and class stereotypes,248
 political support for the
concept of welfare was virtually nonexistent. Welfare reform, enacted
late in the first Clinton administration, eliminated much of the fed-
eral role in setting the terms for benefit payments and transformed
AFDC into a block grant to the states, setting up state legislatures and
courts as the new poverty battleground. 249
 Sixty years after the New
246 For an extended description and critique of The New Property's due process legacy,
see Simon, supra note 180, at 1459-78.
247 The principal victories were Shapiro o. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (holding that
statutory denial of welfare benefits to applicants residing in the state for less than a year
creates an impermissible classification violating equal protection principles), and more
prominently, Goldberg u Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that due process requires a fair
hearing prior to termination of welfare benefits which are based on statutory entitlement
for qualified recipients). The watershed case reversing the trend since Goldberg was Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), in which the Court held that due process does not require
an evidentiary hearing prior to the termination of disability benefits. See also Peter Edel-
man, Responding to the Wake•Up Call: A New Agenda for Poverty Gauges, 24 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 547,547 (1998). Edelman states:
Four facts frame the world as seen by advocates for the poor in 1999. One,
the Constitution is not our friend. If thinking about the rights of the poor
means thinking about any constitutional rights the poor have as a particular
consequence of their poverty, the short answer is, they do not have any. The
Supreme Court saw to that in a series of cases in the early 1970s.... Now we
know that the Constitution provides no recourse for people who would in-
voke it to seek a judicial response to their need for income, health, housing,
education, or any other element of survival.
Edelman, sepia, at 547.
248
 The Presidential campaigns of 1980 through 1992 all featured attacks on welfare
"fraud and abuse," implications that the majority of welfare recipients were having chil-
dren purposely to increase welfare payments, and the like.
210 See Edelman, supra note 247, at 550-51. Here Edelman states:
Although Congress is no longer interested in waging a war on poverty, Con-
gress is far from irrelevant today, as there are still major opportunities to pur-
sue and dangers to avoid in Congress. While Congress and the President
cursed the poor with the Act of 1996, they enacted major child health insur-
ance legislation in 1997. But more than at any time since the 1930s, legislative
and other governmental action affecting the poor is also occurring in state
capitals and locally. The 1996 federal welfare law devolved a vast array of deci-
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Deal social welfare advocates battled to achieve federal administration
and objective statutory criteria that would protect welfare recipients
from arbitrary local government decisions, provision for the poor had
come full circle. 250
Even before Reich's articulation of the "New Property," the Su-
preme Court had rejected the notion that OASDI benefits, earnings-
based or not, could be viewed as property in 1960 in Flemming v. Nes-
ton2" In that case, the Court determined that Congress could amend
the Social Security Act to deny Social Security benefits to a non-citizen
who had been deported because he was a member of the Communist
Party, based on a finding that such a change was not a taking of prop-
erty protected by the Constitution. 252 William Simon has pointed out
that Flemming is a rare case, in that Social Security benefits "were con-
sistently regarded as rights by all three branches, were afforded elabo-
rate procedural protections, and were more secure against substantive
impairment than most forms of private law property." 253 Nonetheless,
the political protection afforded Social Security benefits by the Con-
gress and the political process seemed inherently inferior to the con-
stitutional clue process rights with which Reich and his successors in
poverty jurisprudence attempted to endow welfare benefits. 254 It is
clear, however, that the legal status of property has not been necessary
to protect the benefits paid under the Social Security program. The
concept of government welfare benefits as property trapped the de-
velopment of welfare law in a conceptual box in which the right to a
hearing was substituted for a substantive right to income mainte-
nance. The lessons of welfare jurisprudence are instructive in demon-
strating the limits of constitutional protections, in contrast to the
seemingly unreliable protections of the political process.
D. The Property Rights Fetish
While the attempt to provide a federal constitutional grounding
for welfare rights seemed to reach a dead end in the 1970s, with the
coup de grace delivered in the 1996 welfare reform legislation, the
Flouts to the states; many states, in turn, left a wide range of decisions to the
counties.
Id.
2" See generallyGoRboN, PITIED Nor ENTITLED, supra note 182.
23I See 363 U.S. 603,610-11 (1960).
252 See id. at 605,610-11.
253 Simon, supra note 180, at 1486 n.179.
254 See Reich, New Property, suprcz note 26, at 817.
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search for a constitutional basis for redistribution of wealth generally
continues in other guises. Two recent pieces of scholarship which at-
tempt to develop a theoretical framework for redistribution of income
to insure a more equal society reveal a continuing and apparently un-
shakeable conviction that economic rights must be based on property
ownership.
The goal of Akhil Amar; in his provocative speech on property
and the Constitution made to a Federalist Society meeting in the late
1980s,255
 and co-authors Bruce Ackerman and Anne Alstott, in their
1999 book, The Stakeholder Society, 256
 seems to be to address the widen-
ing gap between rich and poor—between the powerful and the effec-
tively (if not formally) disenfranchised. Amar is concerned with dem-
onstrating the constitutional basis (indeed, imperative) for
redistribution of property. 257
 Ackerman and Alstott simply propose a
new public welfare expenditure financed by a new dedicated tax, a
sort of mirror image of Social Security, 258
255 See Antal., supra note 188.
256 See. ACKERMAN Sc ALST077, supra note 189.
257
 Aran bases his notion of economic independence as a necessity for full citizenship
on what he describes as the "R/republican tradition" in American law: IA] minimal enti-
tlement to property is so important, so constitutive, and so essential for both individual
and collective self-governance that to provide each citizen with that minimal amount of
properly, the government may legitimately redistribute property from other citizens who
have far more than their minimal share." Amar, supra note 188, at 37-38. Amar suggests
the Civil War and the abolition of slavery in the Thirteenth Amendment had to provide a
mechanism to achieve an alternate, inclusive economic democracy:
The solution to the problem ... provides people with inalienable property
rights in their own persons. Moreover, I suggest, it is a vision that, especially
under section two of the Thirteenth Amendment, provides for forty acres and
a nude. It is a vision that provides a right to sustenance and shelter: minimum
sustenance, minimum shelter. Mhe new economic rights under the Re-
construction Amendments are redistributive, at least in part.
M. at 39-40.
Amar deliberately invoked the imagery of Jefferson as well as of Thaddeus Stevens to
provoke thought about the fundamental connection between independent, autonomous
citizenship and economic rights. In addition, he envisions his economic citizenship to
include rights to adequate public education, and access to employment and job training.
See id. at 42.
2," The principal ill Alston and Ackerman seek to cure with their stakeholder proposal
is the rising inequality of income in American society: "Trickle-down economics has utterly
Hied and will continue to fail in the globalizing economy of the future. The past is pro-
logue: By 1995, the top 1% owned 38.5% of the nation's disposable wealth, up from 33.8%
in 1983." Bruce Ackerman Anne Alston, Isaac Marks Memorial Lecture: Your Stake In Amer-
. ica, 41 ARIZ. L. Rev. 249, 250 (1999). Ackerman and Alstott propose a new starkly redis-
tributive public entitlement based on the theory of an economic birthright:
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In many ways President Roosevelt would have been quite com-
fortable with these theories of economic citizenship based as they are
on the notion that the state has an appropriate and necessary role to
play in giving individuals the tools of autonomy and self-support. On
the other hand, redistribution of actual equity, implied by Amar's
"stake in society" birthright for every citizen and Alston and Acker-
man's economic stake to he granted in young adulthood, seems to
take the implicit redistribution accepted by Roosevelt as part of Social
Security well beyond the realm of political 'reality, if not theoretical
desirability.259
It is the perceived need for each individual to have a "stake in
society" that ties these analysts' concepts of economic citizenship to
property ownership. The "stakeholder" theories blend with nine-
teenth century agrarian imagery in relying on remarkably concrete
notions of equity ownership as the necessary basis for full participa-
tion in democratic society. 26° To be sure, both Amar's "forty acres" and
Ackerman and Alstott's "stakeholder" notions of economic citizenship
are consistent with support for public education and job training—
both of which are long-standing public services regularly viewed by
local governments as at least a basic obligation. If the idea of a "stake"
were simply embodied in better public services, there would be little
need to invoke the abolition of-slavery, the Thirteenth Amendment
and Thaddeus Stevens. 261 The really new suggestion, therefOre, is
direct redistribution of property: a tangible economic stake not simply
permitted by the Constitution according to Amar but required by the
Thirteenth Amendment's abolition of property in the form of slav-
ery.262
I would suggest that any vision of economic justice based princi-
pally on equity ownership—however reliant that ownership might be
The basic proposal is straightforward. As young Americans rise to maturity,
they should claim a stake of $80,000 as part of their birthright as citizens
Stakeholders are free. They may use their money for any purpose they see fit:
to start a business or pay for higher education, to buy a house or raise a family
or save for the future. But they insist lake responsibility for their choices....
We do not deity the need for a "social safety net" for Americans who make
particularly bad choices, but this is not our primary focus. We are concerned
with providing a fair opportunity for success for all Americans, and not only
those lucky cum igh to be born to parents of the symbol-using classes.
Id, at 250, 251, 254.
2-59 See supra notes 257-258.
26° See supra notes 257-258.
261 See supra note 257.
262 See supra note 257.
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on redistribution originally—is inescapably based on the assumption
that the market will operate to advance the interests of autonomous
individuals. The presumption is of a neutral market working to the
benefit of autonomous • individuals engaged on a more or less level
playing field—made level by the redistribution of property—and lead-
ing to the maximum aggregate welfare for the largest number of play-
ers. This is the same implicit free market cosmology with which the
arguments for privatization of Social Security are imbued, under
which equity ownership controlled by individuals is a sufficient guar-
antee of income security in old age.
The problem with this equity-based vision of retirement security
is once again essentially temporal: if retirement is voluntary, it must
be based on an assurance of an income stream sufficient to take care
of all needs, including unexpected needs that could emerge down the
road (such as long-term care or catastrophic medical expenses). Eq-
uity, whether purchased, received in a redistributive entitlement pro-
gram, or inherited, is only as valuable in the long run as—and can
only be relied upon to the extent of—its exchange value at the time
need arises. If the initial stake proves to have insufficient value at the
time it is needed in old age retirement, when opportunities to acquire
additional equity are likely to be greatly diminished or even non-
existent, there would seem to be little difference from the perspective
of old age between Aniar's birthright entitlement under the Thir-
teenth Amendment and the free market economic system in place at
the time of the Great Depression. In many ways, the notion of a birth-
right entitlement is the completion of President Roosevelt's vision of a
society where retirement, unemployment and other entitlements
based on earnings rather, than need would replace "the dole," on the
assumption that all Americans would have access to employment and
the tools with which to build a good life. 263
263 See ORLOFF, Stipm note 214, at 290. Orloff states:
A vivid example of [Roosevelt's distaste for welfare and commitment to earn-
ings based entitlement' came when Harry Hopkins. ... eloquently argued for
noncontributory old age and unemployment benefits as a matter of right for
citizens. FDR saw this as being 'the very thing he had been saying he was
against for years—the dole' and vetoed all such proposals.... Roosevelt, Per-
kin, and Witte preferred to develop what they saw as the only reasonable and
fiscally sound long-term solution to the problem of old age dependency: a
contributory program of old-age benefits, to be firmly distinguished from
noncontributory social assistance.
Id.
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Regrettably, however, capitalist market economies undergo peri-
odic, and occasionally catastrophic, crashes in overall economic val-
ues.264 The point of retirement entitlements is to encourage both
work throughout life, and cessation of work in old age with the prom-
ise of a secure income stream to prevent dependence and degrada-
tion of living standards after work has stopped, even in the event of a
catastrophic crash in the value of equity acquired during working life.
A redistribution of property that insures a more equal starting point
in life still cannot prevent the consequences of changes in value of
that property over time—the risk still lies with the individual.
Both of these proposals subscribe, as do those who would privat-
ize Social Security, to the premise that the free market is an essentially
benign mechanism (once the redistributive stake has been handed
out to individuals). Both proposals assume that the distributive power
of the market will sort participants out according to some natural or-
der once the starting point has been made more equal with the initial
economic stake. In this liberal, Lockean vision, the key to democracy
is to insure the autonomy and independence of individual members
of society through decentralization of property ownership. Individual
rights are to be founded on ownership of property, while social equity
and economic access are assumed to follow naturally.
The overall thrust of these stakeholder notions is of redistribu-
tion by command on the basis of citizenship without any other eligi-
bility criteria. The main weakness of plans to grant such an entitle-
ment without regard to need, however, is the lack of justification for
these grants apart from a socially determined goal of improving eco-
nomic opportunity. Without a link to either earnings or need, there is
little cultural precedent or, context for an unconditional grant based
on citizenship. .
Neither stakeholder proposal directly addresses the issue of re-
tirement income (although Ackerman and Alstott's funding proposal
might affect the budget surplus widely advertised as being "saved" for
Social Security) . 265 Yet the same' difficulties would attend a society of
stakeholders who reach retirement age having spent their stake on
some activity or equity that provides no basis for retirement income as
plagued the generation of savers who lost their personal stakes in the
bank failures of the Great Depression. The economic rights that flow
2" See grnerally SHILLER, supra note 147.
265 See ACKERMAN & ALSTOTT, Supra mate 189, at 255-256.
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from an equity stake, whatever its size or timing, can always be lost,
even through no fault of the holder. 	 -
Perhaps an extended catastrophic collapse of values worldwide is
now impOssible given the market safeguards of the regulatory state for
which Ackerman and Alstott apparently have so little use. 266 Nonethe-
less, the inherent risks of equity cannot be cancelled out by equalizing
incomes or access to property ownership at the beginning of a work-
ing life. Moreover, even if individuals are willing to assume the risks of
a crash in the hopes of being a wealthy winner in the future, the insti-
tution of retirement demands certainty, not possibilities—at least for
all but those who have equity to burn.
III. ENTITLEMENT VS. PRIVATIZATION IN THE RETIREMENT CONTEXT:
A NEW NON-PROPERTY
The preceding discussion demonstrates that while the Social Se-
. curity "problem" has been repeatedly characterized as either an eco-
nomic or a demographic crisis, it is neither. Instead, it is a philosophi-
cal and ideological debate over proprietary individualism versus
socially defined entitlement, over the primacy of the property right
principle operating in the free market versus economic rights and
redistribution based on effort rather than ownership. Moreover, as
the examination of the ideas of Reich, Amar, Ackerman and Alstott
reveals, the ideological power of the property right imperative is such
that even those who advocate redistribution to further economic jus-
tice can apparently do so only in the context of a property-based con-
cept of economic rights. 267
My focus here is on retirement and the prevention of economic
dependency and poverty in old age. This is a long-standing social goal
and not the product either of modernity or even of the establishment
of Social Security. The question is how best to accomplish this? Is it
possible to guarantee economic security in old age without violating
basic principles of market capitalism and of a democratic ideal? Priva-
tization advocates argue that it is. not—that the very existence of a
public guarantee in the form of transfer payments distorts the work-
ings of the market and cannot, in the end, be sustained without harm-
ful levels of taxation.268 Redistribution, in this view, is inherently in
266
 See id. at 254. But see SHILLER, supra note 147, at 203-233.
267
 See supra notes 236-263 and accompanying text.
268 See FELDSTEIN, REFORM, supra note 7, at 5.
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opposition to the competitive principles, incentives, and individual
property rights upon which the Market is based. 269
In this final section, I suggest an alternate way of viewing the
choices we face as a society in dealing with an increasingly. older
population. In many ways, this is a discussion about a trade-off be-
tween security and opportunity. Who benefits from this trade? Which
principle provides" greater likelihood of autonomy and at what point?
Notwithstanding the centrality Of the right to private property in
American democracy, a tradition of rights based on labor and earning
alsO has deep cultural roots and provides an alternative democratic
tradition that can serve as the basis for an earnings-based entitlement•
that encompasses redistribution without contradiction.
A. The Importance of Cultural Gratinding of Rights
The first element that must be recognized is the need for as-
serted rights to be grounded in historical cultural assumptions and
accepted patterns- of behavior. Governmental responsibility (at the
town, village, city or state level) for caring for the poor has been ac-
knowledged from the earliest colonial times as the heritage of the
English Poor Law and later approaches to dealing with the poor. 279
However, it is important not to lump together poverty programs in
general with programs for the elderly or for veterans. Older persons
who were known to have been productive members of the community
were generally held to have a higher claim on community assistance
than vagrant persons whose prior contributions to society were un-
known.271 Veterans, first in the Revolutionary War period and more
broadly in the Civil War era, were presumed worthy of assistance,
eventually without any demonstration of need. 272
A major strength of earnings-based benefit programs is this cul-
tural base of acceptance for assistance based  on previous work. In-
deed, the notion that labor brings rights with it is a pre-industrial hu-
man assumption, articulated as amatural right by Locke hi his attempt
to locate the creation of property rights in the act of adding labor to
nature. 273 This "workmanship ideal" is a strain of Western thought
269 See, e.g., Solomon & Barrow, supra nOte 7, at '14.
27° See supra. notes 199-220 and accompanying text.
271
 See supra notes 199-220 and accompanying text.
272
 See supra notes 199-220 and accompanying text.
273 For example, according to Locke's i labor theory of property rights, it would .be the
act of performing labor by picking and gathering apples that would make them one's
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that supports widely divergent philosophic views, from Marx to
Nozick to Sen. 274
In the context of American social welfare programs, it is clear
that some notion of workmanship provides a basis for popular accep-
tance of a right to assistance that is not based on need. In contrast,
there is very little cultural basis for redistribution based solely on so-
cial justice. Even during Reconstruction, in the,aftermath of the larg-
est government "taking" of "property" in the history of the republic in
the form of emancipation of slaves and abolition of the condition of
slavery, wholesale redistribution of Southern property other than
human beings was not widely demanded. Thaddeus Stevens' call for
forty acres and a mule is less remarkable for its constitutional basis
than for its failure to appeal to Northern voters who might have pres-
sured Congress to take action to make sure newly freed slaves had the
economic wherewithal to take control of their lives. 275
As for programs for the poor, public attitudes have been quite
consistent from pre-Revolutionary America forward—only those poor
of demonstrated good character who have some reason acceptable to
the majority for being poor are worthy of even grudging public assis-
tance.276 Contempt for "the dole" did not originate with President
Roosevelt, but rather is a persistent theme of American social welfare
history. 277
 Public responsibility for the poor is accepted, but control of
property. See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 27 ( J.W. Gough ed.,
1976). In his SECOND TREATISE, Locke stated:
'Though the earth, and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet
every man has a property in his own person; This nobody has any right to but
himself. The labor of hii body, and the work of his hands we may say are
properly his. Whatsoever, then, he removes out of the state that nature hath
provided and left it in he hath mixed his labor with, and joined it to some-
thing that is his own, and thereby makes it his property."
Id.
274
 For a discussion of these varying offspring of Lockean property theory, see Ian
Shapiro, Resources, Capacities, and Ownership: The Workmanship Ideal and Distribnlivejustice, in
EARLY MODERN CONCEPTIONS OF PROPERTY 27-35 (John Brewer & Susan Staves eds.,
1996).
275 See generally LEON LITWACK, BEEN IN THE STORM So LONG: THE AFTERMATH OF
SLAVERY (1979); C. VANN WOODWARD, REUNION & REACTION: THE COMPROMISE OF 1877
AND THE END OF RECONSTRUCTION (2d ed. 1966).
272 See HABER & GRATTON, supra note 16, at 117-122..
277 See, e.g., Howell V. Williams, Benjamin Franklin and the Pont' Laws, 18 Soc. SERV. REV.
77, 77 (1994). Benjamin Franklin's attitude toward poor relief.was revealed in a 1773 let-
ter: "'I have sometimes doubted, whether the laws peculiar .to England, which compel the
rich to maintain the poor, have not given the latter a dependence, that very much lessens
the care of providing against the Wants of old age.'" Id.
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the circumstances of their receipt of assistance has been maintained
via requirements such as good moral character and demonstrated in-
ability to work so that public assistance is protected only by the good-
will of the government and the electorate.
Constitutional guarantees of due process are scant protection for
poor people in the absence of broad-based public acceptance of the
premises of assistance, as was clearly demonstrated by the 1996 wel-
fare reform legistation. 278 Thus,' in the absence of clear need, or of
past work history justifying assistance, it is difficult to see how any di-
rect redistribution of property based solely on a goal of achieving
economic equality could be accepted as having anything like the
status of rights.
B. The Risks of the Property Right Box
The workmanship ideal can be seen as an alternative to the
property right imperative driving proposals for privatization of Social
Security. But the idea that an economic entitlement must be based on
a property right to be recognized as a right in itself is clearly not
confined to those who oppose redistribution. As demonstrated above,
even legal analysts sympathetic to the principle of redistribution, who
attempt to develop a theoretical and legal structure in which redistri-
bution is a necessary and inevitable right, seem compelled to base
their theories of rights protected by the Constitution, or of entitle-
ments to be enacted by CongresS, on property ownership.
In the old age income security context, basing entitlement on the
connection between property and rights to future income is a trap
which no theory can spring. The choice between certainty of private
ownership combined with risk that may produce either poverty or
wealth in old age is appealing to,the individual but disastrous as social
policy giiien the consequences for society at large if the gamble fails.
Two factors make the old age income context different from the pov-
erty program context: the possibility of work before retirement and
the impossibility of predicting the future. The first factor provides a
way to base a right on effort rather than property, to socialize the risk
of poverty in old .age for those who can be generally conceded to be
worthy members of society—those who have worked. The second fac-
tor requires a baSis for income promises other than property, whose
value cannot be known until it is too late to acquire more through
276 See Edelman, supra note 247, at 550-51.
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work, in the event the particular property proves not valuable enough
to support living until death.
In the case of Social Security, simply because the payment of
benefits in retirement after a lifetime of work looks very much like a
private pension paid for by taxes does not mean that the payments are
in any way based on equity. As discussed above, the most direct prece-
dent for Social Security,, other than the European social welfare pro-
grains, was the Civil War pension system, which was based not on
property at all but on 'service. 279 The direct right to a stream of in-
come, a share of national productivity, is really the only way to fulfill
the retirement promise, and Social Security is the embodiment of the
retirement promise.
The alternative—a claim to future income based on accumulated
property rights—cannot i escape the fact that the security of the claim
rests on the value of the property at the point the claim must be sa-
tisfied. Such a claim is inherently insecure, and if only the individual's
well-being were at stake; the value of autonomy might demand that
she be allowed to take that risk. This, indeed, is the premise and the
vision of supporters of Social Security privatization: autonomy in de-
ciding how to provide for one's old age and in bearing the risk of bad
choices in exchange for the opportunity to gamble that private prop-
erty values will pay out in one's favor in the future.
The fundamental risk associated with retirement is how to insure
that one has enough income to provide for necessities until the end
of life. The presumption in that phrasing of the risk is that the goal is
self-sufficiency—autonomy at all stages of life upon reaching adult-
hood seems to be the fundamental value to be insured through our -
political and legal systeM. Moreover, this value is held in common
both by those advocating continuation of the current Social Security
system and those advocating privatization. The difference is that the
fundamental result of public entitleinent not based on private prop-
erty is autonomy in old age, whereas the fundamental result of privati-
zation is autonomous decision-making and risk taking before old age,
including the risk of insufficient income at a time when the individual
has little opportunity or ability to make up for bad luck or bad
choices.
The debate has tended to focus on "investment" risk, contrasting
the risk that the benefits individuals have earned under Social Secu-
rity might not be there when they retire because of political decisions
275 See supra notes 199-220 and accompanying text.
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beyond the individual's control against the risk that an individual will
invest unwisely or have bad luck with the result that money put aside
will not be there at retirement. Again, these are the two sides of
autonomy at different points in time. But this formulation of the risk
is focused on individual investment results, rather than social results.
What do we find if we look at social risk, in addition to individual risk?
The possibility of insuring against social risk is at the heart of the
philosophical and political debate over retirement income security.
Social Security is simply the latest vehicle for a fundamental argu-
ment: is it possible to formulate and develop strategies to deal with
"social risks," or is it illegitimate to even pose a problem as a "social"
problem in a market-based society? In the 1930s, the problem seems
to have been formulated this way: there is a social interest in prevent-
ing widespread poverty among those who are too old to be employed
in industrial society in order to preserve social stability and encourage
younger workers not to rebel against market-capitalism. 28° The answer
was Social Security—a socially mediated retirement income entitle-
ment based on the culturally acceptable eligibility requirement of a
lengthy work history and requiring no interference with autonomy in
old age because it was not based on demonstrated need.
The alternative formulation since the late 1970s rejects any
definition or the dilemma of old age income security in "social inter-
est" terms and instead stresses individual interests and autonomous
participation in a neutral marketplace prior to retirement. A private,
equity-based individual accounts scheme allocates all of the risk of the
market onto the individual, allowing the market to determine redis-
tribution of income based essentially on chance. Such an individual-
ized risk eliminates any notion of an entitlement to retirement in-
come—hence the aggressive marketing campaigns cited earlier
designed to play upon fear of old age and inadequate resources.
Yet non,investment-based risks also exist for individuals in a free
market society: for example, the risk of a lifetime of low earnings hi
public education, or manual labor, or other poorly paid employment
that makes savings for retirement difficult or impossible; the risk of
substantial periods of unemployment because of changing technol-
ogy; the risk of a poor education in underfunded public schools that
2HO See ORLOFF, supra note 214, at 284-87 (noting that popular pressure from old age
assistance movements impelled enactment of Social Security); we also BROWN, supra note
125, at 43 ("In the [Advisory] Council's view, the old-age insurance system was not a special
arrangement for a segment of the American people, Inn a means of affording adequate
protection against hardship for all gainfully employed persons throughout the country.").
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leaves the individual with no opportunity to earn enough income to
save for retirement. These risks are ignored in the private account sys-
tem, except to the extent of setting up a minimal "safety net" for the
poor whose gambles did not pay off.
A safety net, however, only deals with individual investment risk
and does not address the social instability which only social insurance
mitigates through its redistributive features. The fact that benefits are
based on earnings, but that low earnings are weighted more heavily,
means that lifetime low wage earners are given greater benefits than a
strictly proportional formula would provide. While privatization advo-
cates see this "combination of equity and adequacy" as a weakness of
the program, it is the precise strength of the social insurance concept,
because it combines entitlement derived from a widely accepted crite-
rion—work—with redistribution that recognizes the social as well as
economic value of work for low pay. It is this recognition that allows
Social Security to insure against social risks as well as the individual
risks that exist outside of market returns.
C. The Importance of Being Entitled: The New Non-Property
Finally, what is the significant advantage of an earnings-based en-
titlement, as opposed to a private plan supplemented by a publicly
funded welfare safety net? Can there be a theoretically defensible ba-
sis for entitlement to income security other than private property?
Why should a right to future income—represented by Social Secu-
rity—be a better candidate for entitlement status than, say, a right to a
college education to prepare for work, or a right to quality day care to
insure a better start in life? The answers lie largely in the particular
characteristics of the institution of retirement.
Social Security represents a right to future consumption based on
current work effort, umnediated by any property right the value of
which could rise or fall over time. Social Security represents a differ-
ent kind of right—not property, but rather, a right to an income
stream without mediation through property. This is essential to the
institution of retirement, which is based on the vast majority of
Americans making the decision to stop work because they have a se-
cure income right for the rest of their lives. An equity-based right
simply cannot provide certainty in value or amount of income.
The concrete results of income rights based on equity for the
elderly, who no longer have many choices about engaging in produc-
tive activity that is rewarded in the marketplace, were demonstrated in
the 1930s—a property right claim on future productivity can wither in
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the face of economic devaluation. It is the value of the property, not
the property itself, that will satisfy the claim for consumption in re-
tirement. The current emphasis on equity as the basis of economic
well-being is essentially a type of resistance to modernity and abstrac-
tion of economic value—something like clinging to the gold standard
in the face of modern floating currency systems.
Moreover, the income entitlement of Social Security is a right in
the pursuit of a specific objective—the social institution of retirement.
If retirement is a socially constructed institution that satisfies pressing
needs (recycling of workers, social stability) rather than a natural
phenomenon, social insurance and redistribution can be seen as a
way to support that institution and its objectives. Privatizers, in con-
trast, look at retirement not as a socially constructed institution in
service of specific objectives but as a natural phenomenon arising out
of individual choice (consistent with their philosophical framework of
autonomous individuals operating in the competitive marketplace).
The latter perspective is essentially ahistorical and ignores the fact
that there was no broad-based retirement expectation or reality be-
fore enactment of the public retirement income entitlement.
There remains the issue of due process and the question of the
status of benefits as property or as something else. Reich failed in his
effort to have public benefits of all sorts accepted as a form of prop-
erty, which would have given recipients procedural clue process
rights—essentially the right to a hearing before benefits could be
taken away. Such a right is significant in the context of benefits based
on need, which is assumed to be a temporary condition; the funda-
mental principle of family needs-based assistance has always been that
the assistance will only be needed for a finite period of time (until the
children are grown, for example, or until work can be found). Re-
tirement benefits, however, are essentially useless if they are not per-
manent. The whole idea of providing retirement benefits is to assure a
permanent income stream until death, and the institution of retire-
ment is built around that assumption, Therefore, clue process rights,
which guarantee a fair hearing before deprivation of property, are
hardly significant where the statutory structure of the retirement
benefit assures that benefits, once begun, will continue until death.
But how secure can a public entitlement actually be if it does not
have the constitutionally protected status of property and can he
changed at any time by Congress? The lessons of welfare reform
should not be lost on those who advocate for the poor as well as for
the elderly: the minimal procedural clue process protections afforded
welfare benefits were insufficient to preserve them in the face of pub-
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lic hostility to "the dole." In the absence of a widely accepted basis for
providing assistance (other than need, which has never been enough
for more than an extremely minimal, conditional payment to the
poor), welfare benefits were not safe from legislative elimination.
Social Security, on the other hand, has faCed several short-term
financing crises in the last thirty years—primarily in the late 1970s
and early 1980s—and Congress has repeatedly acted quickly to ad-
dress the shortfalls without any serious question of eliminating or
drastically scaling back benefits: 281
 This political untouchability has
led pundits to label Social Security "the third rail of American poli-
tics" and critics to lament the inability of politicians to make tough
choices and dramatically revise the program's benefits and financing.
Yet there is no particular constitutional protection afforded Social
Security any more than there was for public assistance based on need.
The "right" status of the public earnings-based entitlement is founded
in the public perception that such a right exists—and that perception
is enforced through the political legislative process. In other words,
citizens have a right to their Social Security benefits because they have
accepted the program as their right, based on their years of earnings
and contributions in taxes. Moreover, this entitlement right is a right
in service and protection of the social institution of retirement and as
such can begin to be thought of seriously as a right rather than simply
a political claim. 282
The entitlement to income represented by Social Security is im-
portant not only for instrumental reasons—that it is the best tool for
accomplishing the social policy goals of mass retirement and social
stability in the face of economic downturns—but because entitlement
is essential as the basis of democracy. Needs-based benefits are inevi-
tably cast as a gift, albeit for good policy reasons, and the very act of
giving—whether in the context of a government welfare program or a
private donation—inescapably creates an unequal relationship. The
donor, either the individual or taxpayers in the aggregate, occupies
the high ground in every way; control over the timing and amount of
the gift and over the identity of the donee automatically confers on
the donor the superior role. Entitlement, in contrast, creates no par-
ticular relationship between the entitled person and the source of the
benefit precisely because it is a right generated from the recipient
281 See EDWARD D. BERKOWITZ & KIM MCQUAID, CREATING THE WELFARE STATE: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 20TH CENTURY REFORM 200-01 (1922).
282
 For a discussion of rights in service of a positive social objective, see. generally
Pikles, supra note 10.
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herself—through earnings—and thus carries no implication of an
unequal power relationship.
The clear consensus of historians is that broad-based retirement,
understood as the voluntary cessation of work in spite of continued
ability and opportunity to work, is a product of industrialization. 283 If
the retirement decision must be based on certainty of income. to the
end of life, privatization with its 'inherent allocation of risk onto the
individual would very likely spell,the end of mass retirement as it cur-
rently exists. If we assume that retirement is still a necessary part of
the economic structure, privatization clearly poses grave institutional
dangers as well as dramatic increases in individual risk. The question
for the twenty-first century, therefore, should be, at least in part, a re-
examination of the necessity and desirability of age-based (as opposed
to disability or unemployment-baSed) retirement.
CONCLUSION: DECONSTRUCTING AESOP'S ANT
Aesop's fable of the grasshopper and the ant, with which this Ar-
ticle began, contains several itnpOrtant themes which pervade the pri-
vatization debate. First, Aesop's story teaches not only the wisdom of
saving but also the moral worth of those who save and, by extension,
of those who have the ability, luck or endowment (both genetic and
financial) to produce more than they can consume and thus to save
that excess production for future consumption. Financial investment
advisors infuse their advertising with this sense of moral well-being
attaching to thrift, savings and investment savvy,.usually contrasting
the older saving generation with the younger baby boom spender who
has nothing to live on in retirement except Social Security and whose
future, it is implied, is dubious at best. 284
Moreover, the grasshopper only survives at the end of the fable
through the charity of the ant who graciously agrees to share her
Stored up grain (and, one supposes, never Ceases to remind the grass-
hopper of her generosity). The modern debate also echoes this part
of the fable as the answer to complaints that a solely private and indi-
vidualized retirement savings plan, such as those being currently de-
2" See Dilley, supra note 200, in 1102-00.
284 One commentator has noted: "Today, you're likely to get less help in retirement.
from your employer and from the cash-strapped Social SecUrity system !ban your parents
did. Therefore, you'll be less likely to have 70% to 80% of your peak earnings at your dis-
posal when you stop working hill time." Peter Keating, You Can Afford the Lifestyle Thu 417ant,
MONEY, Oct. 1996, at 94, 96,
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bated in Congress and elsewhere, 285 would result in many older
Americans arriving at retirement age with insufficient funds to sup-
port them until death. For the supporter of priVate accounts, the solu-
tion to the potential problem of increased poverty amongst the eld-
erly is public and private charity. 286 Charity, of course, whether public
welfare or private gratuities, has the dual advantage of reminding the
recipient of his profligacy in failing to provide for his old age himself
while allOwing the giver to congratulate herself on her own moral and
intellectual superiority in being a financial winner.
Finally, the fable presents the ant's solution to winter starvation
as wealth building. By restricting her consumption in the present and
setting aside those grains of wheat to consume over the winter, the ant
has built herself an equity nest-egg, one which, in the event she does
not consume it completely over the winter, would be available for her
children to inherit (subject, of course, to the vagaries of ant inheri-
tance practices). The grasshopper, in eating and playing over the
summer, has in effect not only consumed his own ability to survive but
also provided nothing kir his family to eat after his own demise. Priva-
tization proposals similarly rely on equity—stock, real estate, other
property—as a basis for financial security in retirement and, not inci-
dentally, of wealth to pass on at death to family or other heirs. Sup-
porters of these arrangements assert that private entitlement in the
form of private property is superior to public entitlement in the form
of Social Security primarily because Social Security does not build in-
dividual equity and thus` provides no opportunity for wealth transfers
at death.
One problem, however, with using the ant-equity analogy as a
guide for human retirement planning is the time-frame for retire-
ment. The fallow winter season of unproductive activity, through
which the ant's stored goods are intended to carry her, is of predict-
able and relatively short duration. In contrast, the human lifespan af-
ter age fifty has expanded substantially since 1900 to eighty and be-
yond at least in the developed world. 287
 Predictions of genetic
breakthroughs that promise regular and healthy active lifespans of
285 See S. 1103, 106th Cong. § 1 (1999); H.R. 3206, 106th Cong. § 1 (1999) (proposing
legislation for privatizing or partially privatizing social security); H.R. 1793, 106th Cong.
§ 1 (1999); H.R. 874, 106th Cong. § 1 (1999).
286 See, e.g., Nickles, supra note 34, at 96.
#87 See JOSEPH S. PIACENTINI JILL FOLEY, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE,
EBRI DATABOOK ON EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 459 (2d ed. 1992).
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over 100 in the near future mean increased uncertainty about the
length of time retirement income will be needed.m
But there is an even more fundamental problem with using the
grasshopper-ant fable as a model for contemporary retirement in-
come security policy: provision for one's old age cannot be based on
setting aside actual goods for consumption in the future. Rather, re-
tirement savings in all forms represent a claim on future production
of the goods and services that must be consumed in old age after the
individual has stopped economically productive activity. 28g Financial
equity—shares of stock, for example—cannot itself be consumed; it
must be liquidated in order to finance the purchase of consumable
goods, either all at once, through sale of the equity itself, or gradually
through the distribution of dividends representing the earnings un-
derwriting its value.
It is the value of the equity at the time of necessary consumption
(paying for long-term health care, for example) that will determine
how well the elderly individual will live, and that value will be deter-
mined by the state of the economy at the point of consumption in the
future. Such a future value is quite difficult to predict forty or even
five years in advance, depending on the type of equity involved. His-
torically, accumulation of enough equity to insure income until death
has been rare, as human beings have tended to remain in the produc-
tive work force until disability from advancing age forced an exit.
Thus, insuring sufficient income until death is a perennial human
concern.
However, while aging is a natural stage of life, one that promises
to extend further and further as this century progresses, retirement
without disability, particularly for the middle and working classes, is a
social institution created to meet the needs of the industrial society of
the twentieth century. Prior to the enactment of Social Security, re-
tirement was a minority phenomenon available only to those with
sufficient equity to insure a stream of income for the relatively brief
period of post-work life in old age. For all but the very wealthy in
nineteenth and early twentieth century America this was usually the
2g8 See Sieve Farrar, Today's Babies Can. Expect to Live to 130, LONDON SUNDAY 'rims, Feb.
14, 1999; Nick Nuttall,. Life Could Begin at 100 if Scientists Have Their Way, LONDON TIMES,
Aug. 30, 1993; Shankar Vedaniam, Ship the Food and Sex and Live to Age of 170, DEN, PosT,
June 30, 1996, at A36.
2" TO some extent, housing may be an exception to this rule if the retired person has
paid off a mortgage on a family home, but even in that case there are maintenance and
property tax expenses that still have to be paid throughout retirement.
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family farm being worked by adult children under a promise of in-
heritance.29° The mid-twentieth century development of the institu-
tion of voluntary retirement at sixty-five or earlier for almost all work-
ers, regardless .of physical or mental capacity for continued work, has
been based on the understanding that claims on future goods and
services will be satisfied through a permanent entitlement to a life-
time stream of income in retirement in the form of Social Security
benefits. 291
The Social Security privatization debate has devolved into a
dreary recitation of the virtues of saving in order to meet future re-
tirement needs. The rewards of a lifetime of equity investing are pre-
sented as the smart alternative to the poor "return on investment"
offered by Social Security and the perceived risks of reliance on a fu-
ture stream of income secured not by a propertyinterest but by politi-
cal consensus. The real "crisis" in Social Security, however, is usually
seen as the challenge of supporting the public retirement program in
the face of a demographic shift—too many retirees to be supported by
too few workers. The solution most frequently discussed is partial or
full "privatization"that is, transforming the public right represented
by entitlement to social security retirement income into private prop-
erty rights represented by individual accounts.
Yet even in the midst of this fairly high level of public concern
about the social resources necessary to support an aging population,
retirement at relatively early ages, long before the aging process takes
a real toll on productive capacity, is being marketed to the American
public in a remarkably golden and optimistic light. The typical adver-
tisement for financial investment firms seeking clients to invest re-
tirement savings pictures an older, but not elderly, couple, enjoying
life at the seashore or on the golf course, with no physical or mental
impairments. The clear message is that retirement is not only the
primary goal of a working life, it is a halcyon period in which Ameri-
cans can expect a better life than they had while they were working.
Retirement has become the goal of working itself—the new secular
heaven. This is one reason why privatization's real focus is wealth-
building and risk-taking rather than retirement security.
Clearly, however, the two major problems presented by those who
'argue for privatization—the need for higher rates of return, and too
290 See GRAEBNER, supra note 16, at 14.
291 See Id. at 162-63 (" Porkers were entitled to pensions after a long and useful life in
industry.").
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few workers supporting too many retirees—cannot be solved by the
same measure. Higher investment returns, by their nature, are likely
for some, but not all, of those saving for retirement. Those savings
have to be cashed in at retirement and ultimately represent a claim on
productivity at that moment in time. If there are really too few work-
ers in the twenty-first century to support all retirees when their claims
are cashed in, the only solution is to have fewer retirees. While few of
those supporting dramatic reductions in public redistributive social
insurance would characterize it as a major goal of privatization, reduc-
ing the number of retirees might in fact be its most widely-felt result.
It may well be true that retirement as a social mechanism has out-
lived its usefulness in an era of apparent labor shortages and increas-
ing opportunities for older workers to change careers and continue
working well into old age. The debate so far, however, has yet to di-
rectly address the end of retirement as a probable or even possible
result of privatization, focusing instead on the upside possibilities of
market investment and largely ignoring the downside both for indi-
viduals and for society as a whole.
Ultimately, the retirement entitlement is meaningless in the con-
text of a system based on risk. The upside possibility of making a kill-
ing in the market is unlikely to be an adequate substitute sufficient to
sustain mass levels of retirement for the certainty of an income stream
in retirement for millions of average and low wage workers. The very
taking of the risk, in addition, tends to change the attitude of the av-
erage person from that of a critical citizen to that of a self-interested
private investor—to the benefit of the companies being invested in
but perhaps at the expense of civic participation and identification of
public, as opposed to private, interest and needs.
Aesop's ant has served as the model of thrift, industry and self-
denial—indeed as the precursor and embodiment of the Protestant
ethic—for over 2000 years. It may, however, be time for the ant herself
to retire. In a fluid twenty-first century economy, where the property
right itself may no longer have the resonance it has had over the cen-
turies of development of Western common and civil law, the public
and legal scholars alike may begin to be more comfortable with the
notion of rights to future income unconnected to the property para-
digm. Such a shift in perspective seems certain to be the only sound
basis for continuation of the institution of old-age retirement very far
into the future.
